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1. Introduction
Although the  idea of  ‘dialogue’ entails a  form of reciprocal exchange of ar-
guments between the actors,1 in this contribution the notion of ‘dialogue’ (‘ju-
dicial dialogue’) will be construed specifically as any form of (unilateral) refer-
ence in the reasoning of domestic court to the case law of the European Court 
of  Human Rights.2 Therefore, not only non-mandatory references to the  au-
thority of ECtHR3 are presented, but also the  instances where national courts 
are obliged to refer to the Strasbourg case law and such cases, where a reference 
should have been made but is missing (as a negative example of lack of judicial 
dialogue). In other words, both dialogue as conversation (with no specific goal 
apart from the dialogue itself) and dialogue as deliberation (a form of dialogue 
* Dr iur., Assistant Professor at the Department of European Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law 
and Administration, University of Lodz
1 See: F. Cafaggi (ed.), Judicial interaction techniques – their potential and use in European fun-
damental rights adjudication. Final handbook (Centre for Judicial Cooperation 2014), <www.
nsa.gov.pl/download.php?id=165> (access: 20 February 2016) 38. 
2 See e.g.: D.S. Law, W.-C. Chang, ‘The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue’ (2011) 86 Washington 
Law Review, p. 523. 
3 On the non-mandatory references to foreign law and case law, see: M. Bobek, Comparative 
Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (OUP 2013). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-707-7.05
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aimed at reaching a common agreement)4 will be presented. In all cases the con-
tribution will focus only on such references that concentrate on the interpreta-
tion of the ECHR. 
This contribution will not add to the  discussion as to the  position of  the 
judicial dialogue as a phenomenon of  legal reasoning. It must be emphasised 
though that the  author strongly believes that judicial dialogue (in its widest 
possible understanding which is assumed in this paper) contributes ex defini-
tione towards the quality of adjudication. The dialogue extends horizons while 
identifying the  law and fundamental values at its foundations. Still, the ques-
tion whether judicial dialogue as a form of legal reasoning is indeed positive or 
just a silly ‘sophistry’ as labelled by the late Justice Antonin Scalia5 will not be 
addressed here. 
Apart from the abovementioned classifications of dialogue (against the crite-
ria of mandatoriness and purpose) one may distinguish the categorisation of de-
liberative dialogue vis-à-vis the criterion of interrelatedness i.e. the relation be-
tween the referring decision6 and decision to which the reference is made. Here 
one may point out at unifying (affirmative), and engaged dialogue. The  latter 
can be either concurring or diverging (dissenting). The first type occurs when 
the  national (referring) court simply accepts the  reasoning and  interpretation 
proposed by another court. This type of reference to case law of other court or 
courts can be qualified as ‘judicial dialogue’ only if one applies the definition 
of  a dialogue which has been assumed in  the present contribution, i.e. a  very 
broad one (dialogue as any form of  reference to reasoning of  another court). 
The  second type –  engaged dialogue –  is more interesting since it assumes 
a more active approach of a national court: Not only does it internalise and pres-
ent the case law of another court, but it does so critically, either by generally de-
parting from the interpretative standpoint underpinning the decision of another 
court (dissenting dialogue) or by accepting it in principle, but nuancing the de-
tails of  the legal analysis (concurring dialogue). This type of  dialogue, if  re-
ciprocal (i.e. dialogue sensu stricto), contributes substantially towards the  de-
velopment of a more elaborate interpretation of  law.7 In addition, the engaged 
4 See: L. Tremblay, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law, p. 617. 
5 See: N. Dorsen, ‘The relevance of foreign legal materials in U.S. constitutional cases: A con-
versation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, p. 519 and Law D.S., ‘Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Di-
plomacy’ (2015) 4 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 164. D.S. Law notes that Justice 
Scalia, although not eager to refer to foreign precedents while interpreting American consti-
tutional law, was at the same time a frequent visitor of foreign constitutional courts, interest-
ed in their practice. 
6 I.e. the decision entering into a dialogue with another decision. 
7 Let us mention in this respect the famous Von Hannover v Germany saga involving the dia-
logue between the ECtHR and the German Constitutional Court as described in e.g. B. Peters, 
‘The Rule of  Law Dimensions of  Dialogues Between National Courts and  Strasbourg’, [in:] 
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dialogue constitutes a  perfect expression of  constitutional pluralism building 
the  truly common constitutional identity (resulting from genuine ‘unification 
in diversity’).8 If it happens to be one-sided though (i.e. the  ‘dialogue’ consist-
ing of establishing the  interpretative consensus by international court without 
the follow-up of implementation of the interpretative position of international 
court by its national counterparts), it may lead to fragmentation of ‘interpreta-
tive regimes’ and dysfunction of the systems aimed at enhancing the coherence 
(such as the ECHR). 
The judicial dialogue – generally having the  function of eliminating inter-
pretative divergences between different judicial authorities and  avoiding im-
pediments to law certainty – may serve the solution to different types of con-
flicts: conflicts of  jurisdictions,9 conflicts of systems10 or conflict of particular 
norms.11 Therefore, one may propose the  classification of  judicial dialogue 
vis-à-vis the criterion of a conflict solution (the categorisation of dialogue, as 
generally serving the  solution of different forms of  conflicts, into groups dis-
tinguished by reference to the type of conflict which a given form of dialogue 
intends to resolve). 
Finally, one may classify the judicial dialogue vis-à-vis the criterion of appro-
priateness understood as the accuracy of the referring court’s reasoning seeking 
(or failing) to involve references to other courts’ case law. From this perspective 
one may categorise dialogue as proper (i.e. referring to accurately collected case 
law of other courts and analysing it properly from methodological point of view12), 
fake or decorative (i.e. pretending to refer to the case law of other courts but in fact 
just decorating the  reasoning by random references to inappropriately collect-
ed and  inaptly analysed decisions), failed (i.e. missing the  opportunity to refer 
to the  case law of  other courts at all where one should reasonably expect that 
such jurisprudence is presented) and other (i.e. non-classifiable to other catego-
ries, e.g. veiled13). This classification shall be applied in this contribution because 
it seems to be the  most meaningful from the  practical perspective. It  explains 
M. Kanetake, A. Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels 
(OUP 2016), p. 222. 
8 Otherwise the system as a whole could be questioned. 
9 Judicial dialogue as the  solution to the  conflicts of  jurisdictions was proposed e.g. by 
K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Juris-
dictions – Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5 Max Planck UNYB 67. 
10 W.W. Burke-White “points at ‘interjudicial dialogue’ as a method of counterbalancing the dan-
ger of fragmentation of international law” (W.W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ 
(2004) 961 Faculty Scholarship 971). 
11 See: F. Cafaggi (ed.), ‘Judicial interaction techniques’ (n. 1), pp. 13–14 and the writings referred 
to therein, in particular the F. Kelsen, ‘Derogation’, [in:] H. Klecatsky, R. Marcic, H. Schambeck 
(eds.), Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule (1968).
12 This form of dialogue can be unifying, diverging or concurring. 
13 A veiled (or a hidden) dialogue is a form of dialogue where a national court actually does refer 
to other courts’ case law but does not admit it. 
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whether national courts actually engage in  dialogue with the  ECtHR, pretend, 
or simply fail to do so.
One cannot but note that these classifications (vis-à-vis the criteria of mand-
atoriness, purpose, interrelatedness, conflict solution and appropriateness) are to 
a  certain extent mutually overlapping. For example, diverging dialogue can be 
proper (if based on thorough analysis and accurate methodology) whereas affirm-
ative dialogue can be a fake one. 
The forms of judicial dialogue were categorised in this contribution as proper 
(actually implementing the  ECtHR case law or dissenting with the  Strasbourg 
Court after thorough analysis of its jurisprudence), fake (Strasbourg ‘precedents’ 
employed as a  mere decoration of  reasoning without any attempts to estab-
lish properly the actual interpretative consensus of  the Convention) and failed 
(where no reference was made and ECtHR case law was simply ignored). Finally, 
separate category will be proposed for decisions, which do not fit either of these 
three categories. 
The first part of  this work describes the  normative framework of  judicial 
dialogue, referring to the  impact of  the ECtHR case law on the  Polish legal 
system in general, the issue of the duty of observance of the Strasbourg Court’s 
case law (resulting either from explicit provisions adopted to that end or from 
a general normative framework as construed by supreme national judicial au-
thorities) and the question of reopening of proceedings as a consequence of an 
ECtHR ruling. 
The second part of this contribution is devoted to the practice of courts in CEE 
States in as much as they enter into a dialogue with the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. Special attention is paid to the Polish experience for obvious reasons 
– the author speaks Polish and the databases of jurisprudence are easily accessible 
to him. However, one should stress that in none of the CEE States, which will be 
presented in this contribution (apart from Poland, also Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Russian Federation and Ukraine) there exist accessible databases of ju-
risprudence translated into English. It makes the tasks of description of dialogue 
of CEE courts with the ECtHR particularly difficult. The second part of the con-
tribution will thus focus on the classification of case law of domestic courts of six 
CEE States vis-à-vis the criterion of appropriateness and thus it will distinguish 
domestic courts’ decisions according to whether they belong to a  proper, fake 
and failed dialogue category and finally will identify and describe rulings which 
are not non-classifiable. 
The concluding remarks will attempt to provide a general assessment of the 
accomplishment of the duty of the domestic courts to enter into dialogue with 
the ECtHR acquis and to explain reasons for occasional failures as well as to 
suggest instruments aimed at enhancing the  dialogue (also the  sensu stricto 
judicial dialogue i.e. reciprocal references) of national courts with the Stras-
bourg Court. 
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The methodology of this contribution consists of the desk analysis of the na-
tional legislation and case law of domestic courts (supreme courts, ordinary courts 
and administrative courts).14 The references to jurisprudence of national consti-
tutional courts will only be made exceptionally in order to depict the difference 
between constitutional courts acquis, which often evoke the Strasbourg decisions 
and practice of other national courts where references are sparse. References to 
constitutional courts’ practice will appear in this contribution since a) the practice 
of the Polish Constitutional Court concerning the application of the ECtHR case 
law was already presented by the author of this contribution elsewhere15 and be-
cause b) it is indispensable to make the reference to constitutional courts’ practice 
of other CEE States in order to draw conclusions concerning the practice of other 
courts in these countries. 
Pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, States Parties to the ECHR – and their 
courts – are primarily responsible for an effective protection of rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the  Convention and  its Protocols.16 In  order to fulfil this 
duty, national courts must develop a regular dialogue with the ECtHR in order to 
reflect in their decisions the evolving interpretation of the Convention. This study 
is focused on whether this task is effectively accomplished. 
This contribution will take the normative framework as the starting point. This 
part of the analysis will first provide a brief overview of the impact of the ECtHR 
case law on the Polish legal system in order to highlight the significance of  the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence for the Polish legislative authority. It will also present 
the CEE States’ domestic legal provisions, guidelines or decisions adopted by su-
preme judicial bodies concerning the duty of observance of  the ECHR and  the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law. Such presentation is necessary in order to conclude 
that there exist different normative (adequate provisions) or systemic (key deci-
sions of supreme judicial authorities) instruments in all these States in order to 
assure effective implementation of the Convention standard. It must be noted that 
the case law of national courts does not always fit this general normative frame-
work. Finally, the issue of reopening of proceedings following an adverse ruling 
of  the ECtHR shall be discussed as an ultimate response of  domestic courts to 
the Strasbourg decisions. 
14 The research of the databases was aimed at finding references to the ECHR and to the ECtHR 
case law. 
15 See: M. Górski, ‘Уже лучше, но все еще недостаточно хорошо: опыт применения Ев-
ропейской конвенции в практике Конституционного Трибунала Республики Польша’ 
(2013) 4 Сравнительное конституционное обозрение (Institute of Law and Public Poli-
cy), p. 84.
16 See e.g.: Melnichuk and  Others v  Romania, App. nos 35279/10 and  34782/1 (ECtHR, 5 May 
2015), para. 77. 
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2. The Normative Framework
2.1. The Polish Example of the Influence of the ECtHR Case 
Law on the Domestic Legal System
The guaranteeing of the effectiveness to the Convention standard – for which 
the States Parties to the ECHR are primarily responsible – entails two types of ob-
ligations. The one concerns the implementation of adverse decisions against Po-
land (which may include individual measures such as the restitutio in  integrum 
and general measures such as, in the first place, amendment of national legisla-
tion). The other entails the duty of national bodies (with the pivotal role of na-
tional courts) to ‘take into account’ the standard of  interpretation developed by 
the ECtHR while adjudicating. 
In case of Poland, since its accession to the Convention in 1993, the ECtHR deliv-
ered 1099 judgments including 925 finding at least one violation.17 The biggest neg-
ative score concerned the length of proceedings (434 adverse judgments) and the 
right to liberty and security (299 judgments). More than 100 adverse decisions con-
cerned the right to private and family life (107) and the right to a fair trial (106). 
The case law of the ECtHR had an overwhelming impact on both Polish law 
and judicial practice. It is hard to find nowadays an area of the Polish public law, 
which has not been affected by the  Strasbourg case law. The  duty of  legislative 
implementation of the ECtHR case law is also accepted by the Polish legal schol-
arship.18 Only a few major changes in the Polish legal system are mentioned here 
as examples proving that the influence of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Polish law 
is indeed overwhelming and profound. 
Until 2001 when the new Law on the procedure concerning petty offences19 en-
tered into force, the first instance bodies adjudicating in petty offences cases were 
the so-called magistrates’ courts for petty offences (kolegia do spraw wykroczeń), 
subordinate to the executive branch of state authority (ministry) and composed 
of non-lawyers who were not independent and did not enjoy guarantees of inde-
pendence, in particular, immunities. The 1997 Constitution abolished the mag-
istrates’ courts for petty offences and  transferred their jurisdiction to ordinary 
courts. That change was introduced in order to ensure (among others) compatibil-
ity with Art. 6 ECHR. As noted by the Constitutional Court,20
17 All statistics come from Council of Europe, ‘Statistics of violations 1959–2015’, <http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2015_ENG.pdf> (access: 28 February 2016). 
18 See: instead of many others, Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, Wykonywanie wyroków Europejskiego 
Trybunału Praw Człowieka przez Sejm (Warszawa 2012). 
19 Law of 24 August 2001 on the procedure concerning petty offences, O.J. 2001 No. 106, item 
1149 as amended. 
20 Case K 6/94 (Polish Constitutional Court, 21 November 1994), para. 4. 
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it is the very essence of the administration of justice that adjudication must be asole privilege 
of courts and other branches of state power must not interfere with their activities or partici-
pate in them. It is the consequence of a special role of the judiciary in the protection of rights 
and freedoms of individuals and it is confirmed by […] Art. 6 of [ECtHR].21
The Swiss experience of Bezirksanwalten in Schiesser22 and the Dutch experi-
ence of auditeur-militairs in de Jong, Baljet and van den Brink23 and the disquali-
fication of the latter organs as “other officers authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power” in the meaning of Art. 5(3) ECHR was the major reason why the new Pol-
ish Code of Criminal Procedure assumed that prosecutors are no longer author-
ised by law to order pre-trial detention.24 As a part of the executive, they did not 
have sufficient independence, which is required from state officers responsible for 
applying such form of deprivation of liberty. Moreover, they were also parties to 
criminal proceedings at the judicial stage of the process. The approach taken by 
the drafters of the new procedural regulation in criminal cases was later confirmed 
by the ECtHR in Niedbała where the Court noted that “prosecutors, in the exercise 
of their functions, are subject to supervision of an authority belonging to the exec-
utive branch of the Government” and “their position in the criminal proceedings 
as provided for by law as it stood at the material time […], must be seen as that 
of a party to these proceedings.”25 
Following the  Broniowski decision,26 the  first pilot judgment of  the ECtHR, 
Poland introduced the law on the so-called Bug River claims,27 which was a suc-
cessful implementation of  the Court’s ruling.28 Those entitled to compensation 
from the  State for the  property left beyond the  eastern border of  Poland after 
the II World War (territories previously constituting a part of the Republic of Po-
land and now belonging to Ukraine or Belarus) may now obtain adequate sums 
and have their claims settled. 
21 In Polish: “do istoty wymiaru sprawiedliwości należy, by sprawowany on był wyłącznie przez 
sądy, a pozostałe władze nie mogły ingerować w te działania czy w nich uczestniczyć. Wyni-
ka to ze szczególnego powiązania władzy sądowniczej z ochroną praw i wolności jednostki 
i znajduje potwierdzenie zarówno w szczegółowych normach Konstytucji (zwłaszcza Art. 56 
ust. 1 przepisów konstytucyjnych), jak i w konwencjach międzynarodowych (zwłaszcza Art. 6 
Europejskiej Konwencji o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności).” 
22 Schiesser v the Netherlands, App. no. 7710/76 (ECtHR, 4 December 1979), para. 31. 
23 De Jong, Mr. Baljet and  Mr. van den Brink v the  Netherlands, App. nos 8805/79, 8806/79 
and 9242/81 (ECtHR, 22 May 1984), in particular para. 49. 
24 See: P. Hofmański, [in:] L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o  Ochronie Praw Człowieka i  Podst-
awowych Wolności. Tom I. Komentarz do artykułów 1–18 (Wydawnictwo CH Beck 2010) 201. 
25 Niedbała v Poland, App. no. 27915/95 (ECtHR, 4 July 2000), paras 52–53. 
26 Broniowski v Poland, App. no. 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004). 
27 Law of  8 July 2005 on the  implementation of  the right to compensation for property left 
outside of present borders of the Republic of Poland [Ustawa o realizacji prawa do rekom-
pensaty z  tytułu pozostawienia nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej], O.J. 2014, item 1090. 
28 E. G. v Poland and 175 other applications, App. no. 50425/99 (ECtHR, 23 September 2008). 
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After another pilot judgment in the Hutten-Czapska case,29 which concerned 
the  systemic violation of  the right to property by laws imposing on landlords 
restrictions in  respect of  rent increases and  the termination of  leases, the  new 
scheme of subsidies was created for the restoration of private property.30 The own-
ers of property are eligible for the  so-called ‘premiums’ paid from public funds 
that reduce the costs of  renovation and  investment in private property. Moreo-
ver, the Constitutional Court decided31 that limitation of liability of the local gov-
ernment vis-à-vis private estate owners for the  non-provision of  social housing 
for persons evicted from their buildings violated the  Constitution. Since then 
the  owners of  houses, from which the  eviction of  tenants was ordered but due 
to shortage of  social housing the  eviction was not enforced, get compensations 
from the local government under Art. 417 of the Polish Civil Code. Subsequently 
to this amendment other cases concerning the analogous problem to that of the 
Hutten-Czapska decision were struck out from the list of cases.32 
The Kudła judgment33 in which the ECtHR ruled that “the applicant had no 
domestic remedy whereby he could enforce his right to a ‘hearing within a rea-
sonable time’ as guaranteed by Art. 6(1) of the Convention” triggered the adop-
tion of  the Law on the  right to compensation for delayed court proceedings 
and criminal preliminary proceedings.34 The act at stake was then subsequent-
ly amended which was a consequence of further rulings of the ECtHR35 where 
the Court did not find the legislation under the said Law an effective measure.36 
29 Hutten-Czapska v Poland, App. no. 35014/97 (ECtHR, 19 June 2006). 
30 Law of 21 November 2008 on supporting thermo-modernisation and renovation, O.J. 2014, 
item 712. 
31 Case SK 51/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, 23 May 2006), see also: Case P 14/06 (Polish Con-
stitutional Court, 11 September 2006). 
32 See e.g.: The Association of Real Property Owners in Łódź v Poland, App. no. 3485/02 (ECtHR, 
decision, 8 March 2011). 
33 Kudła v Poland, App. no. 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000). 
34 Law of 17 June 2004 on the complaint available in case of the violation of the right of the 
party to have the case heard in reasonable time by the prosecutor in preliminary proceed-
ings and by the court in judicial proceedings [Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony 
do  rozpoznania sprawy w  postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorow-
anym przez prokuratora i  postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki], O.J. 2004 
No. 179, item 1843 as amended. 
35 See: Tur v  Poland, App. no. 21695/05 (ECtHR, 23 October 2007) and  Zwoźniak v  Poland, 
App. no. 25728/05 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007). 
36 See: the  statement of  reasons presented by the  Government to the  Parliament while pro-
posing the bill on the amendment of the Law on the complaint available in case of the vio-
lation of the right of the party to have the case heard in reasonable time by the prosecutor 
in preliminary proceedings and by the court in judicial proceedings, document of the Sejm 
of the Republic of Poland of VI Term, no. 1281 of 30 October 2008 2 where the Government 
noted that “Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka w ostatnio wydanych wyrokach w sprawach 
Tur przeciwko Polsce (wyrok z dnia 23 października 2007 r., skarga nr 21695/05) oraz Zwoźniak 
przeciwko Polsce (wyrok z dnia 13 listopada 2007 r., skarga nr 25728/05), pomimo skorzysta-
nia przez skarżących z możliwości złożenia skargi na przewlekłość postępowania, nie uznał 
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Unfortunately, the  practice of  Polish courts was rather disappointing because 
they did not, while applying the provisions of  the Law, manage to assure that 
the complaint on delayed proceedings would constitute an “appropriate and suf-
ficient redress.” It resulted in the delivery of another pilot judgment in Rutkowski 
and others v Poland.37
The Tysiąc ruling38 that concerned the lack of effective remedy for patients will-
ing to challenge the doctor’s decision concerning the diagnosis and therapy (viola-
tion of positive procedural obligation resulting from Art. 8 ECHR) resulted in the 
adoption of the Law on patients’ rights.39 It provides for the patient’s right to file 
an objection against doctor’s decision, which is adjudicated by special committees 
established by the Ombudsman for patients’ rights. 
The very liberal 2015 Law on Assemblies40 was directly inspired by Bączkowski41 
of  the ECtHR and  the Constitutional Court’s decision K 44/12 which was itself 
substantially driven by the Strasbourg case law.42 The new Law – among others 
– provides for an unformalized procedure of notification concerning the intention 
to organise an assembly (including ‘simplified procedure’ where the public author-
ity cannot ban a  planned assembly) and  strengthens the  mechanism of  judicial 
review of administrative decisions regarding assemblies. 
2.2. The Duty of Observance of the ECtHR Case Law
If interpreted literally, Polish law does not provide for a  duty to amend 
the law in order to bring it in line with the case law of the ECtHR (unlike in the 
Czech Republic or Ukraine43). Nor there exist any guidelines44 adopted by e. g. 
ustawy z dnia 17 czerwca 2004 r. o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania spra-
wy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki (Dz.U. Nr 179, poz. 1843) za sku-
teczny środek krajowy w rozumieniu Art. 13 Konwencji i stwierdził, że doszło do naruszenia 
wskazanego przepisu.”
37 Rutkowski and  others v  Poland, App. nos 72287/10, 13927/11 and  46187/11 (ECtHR, 7 July 
2015). 
38 Tysiąc v Poland, App. no. 5410/03 (ECtHR, 20 March 2007). 
39 Law of  6 November 2008 on patients’ rights and  Ombudsman for patients’ rights [Ustawa 
o prawach pacjenta i Rzeczniku Praw Pacjenta], O.J. 2016, item 186. 
40 Law of 24 July 2015 on Assemblies, O.J. 2015, item 1485. In the statement of reasons of the 
bill it was noted that “przedmiotowy projekt ustawy stanowi realizację wyroku Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego z dnia 18 września 2014 r., sygn. akt K 44/12 oraz wytycznych wskazanych 
przez Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka w wyroku z dnia 3 maja 2007 r. w sprawie Bącz-
kowski i inni przeciwko Polsce (skarga nr 1543/06).” 
41 Bączkowski v Poland, App. no. 1543/06 (ECtHR, 3 May 2007). 
42 Case K 44/12 (Polish Constitutional Court, 18 September 2014) where the  Constitutional 
Court referred to the Bączkowski decision of the ECtHR. 
43 See further remarks on the Czech and Ukrainian legislations concerning the implementation 
of the ECtHR case law. 
44 Understood as a single document synthesising the approach of the highest judicial authori-
ties.
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the  Constitutional Court or the  Supreme Court encouraging courts to follow 
the  jurisprudence of  the Strasbourg Court (unlike in  Russia). Of course, while 
interpreting the norms of Polish law systematically, one must take into consider-
ation that pursuant to Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution of 1997 Poland observes 
its international obligations and according to Art. 91 of the Constitution ratified 
international agreement constitute part of  the domestic legal order and shall be 
applied directly having precedence over conflicting statutes. Since the ECtHR is an 
authoritative interpreter of the Convention whose decisions establish the compul-
sory mode of understanding the scope of obligations deriving from the Conven-
tion, Polish courts are bound to observe the provisions of the Convention and its 
Protocols exactly as the ECtHR interprets them. 
The implementation of ECHR is not limited to the consequences of Art.  46 
ECHR (i.e. to abide the  final judgment of  the ECtHR in  case to which a  given 
State was a party) but rather it constitutes a wider problem of abiding by the Con-
vention standard in accordance with Art. 1 ECHR. Consequently, the States Par-
ties to the Convention are to assure effectively rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the ECHR. This does not lead inextricably to the obligation to undertake a dia-
logue with the Strasbourg court, nonetheless it is hard to imagine ‘observance’ as 
defined above without a ‘dialogue’. 
Polish courts accepted their duty to take into consideration the Strasbourg case 
law while deciding cases. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the duty to respect the  decisions of  the European Court of  Human Rights lays also on 
the courts. It is not just a question of taking the position of the ECtHR into account while 
interpreting the Convention and construing the domestic law in accordance with that inter-
pretation, but equally of taking concrete steps aimed at implementing the judgment of the 
ECtHR.45
However, the quotation comes from the judgment concerning the reopening 
of proceedings in consequence of an adverse judgment of the ECtHR – the issue, 
which was later addressed differently by the Supreme Court46 and which will be 
discussed later. In general, the Supreme Court already back in 1995 declared in its 
landmark decision that “since the accession of Poland to the Council of Europe, 
the  jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human Rights in  Strasbourg may 
and ought to be taken into account while interpreting national law.”47 The Court 
45 Case V CSK 271/08 (Supreme Court, 28 November 2008). In Polish: “obowiązek respektowa-
nia wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka spoczywa zatem także na  sądach. 
Chodzi tu nie tylko o uwzględnianie stanowiska Trybunału przy wykładni postanowień Kon-
wencji i tłumaczenie przepisów prawa krajowego w zgodzie z tą wykładnią, lecz o podjęcie 
konkretnych działań zmierzających do zadośćuczynienia wyrokowi Trybunału.”
46 Case III CZP 16/10 (Supreme Court, resolution of the panel of 7 judges, 30 November 2010). 
47 Case III ARN 75/94 (Supreme Court, order, 11 January 1995). In  Polish: “od  momen-
tu wstąpienia Polski do  Rady Europy orzecznictwo Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
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further added that the Strasbourg case law should serve as a “significant source 
of interpretation while interpreting provisions of Polish law.” That statement was 
later invoked on many occasions both by the Supreme Court itself48 and ordinary49 
and administrative courts.50
The duty of observance of the ECtHR case law must not be construed as mean-
ing that domestic courts are bound to follow the Strasbourg judgments without 
taking into account the specific circumstances of cases pending before national 
courts in contrast to the ones at the base of the ECtHR decisions. This duty must be 
understood as the need to follow the Strasbourg standard of interpretation of the 
Convention and not as mechanically transcribing the ECtHR findings on – some-
times specific – circumstances of a given case decided by the national court. Guar-
anteeing effectiveness of the ECtHR case law must be understood as two separate 
obligations of national courts which one must distinguish: while national courts 
must assure effective implementation of an adverse Strasbourg judgment in a giv-
en case (to the greatest possible extent by the restitutio in integrum), in their regular 
practice of interpretation and application of the national law they must “take into 
account” the Convention standard so as to avoid violations of the ECHR. 
In Czech Republic, pursuant to Art. 1.2 of  the Constitution of 16 December 
1992, “the Czech Republic shall observe its obligations resulting from interna-
tional law.” According to Art.  95.1 of  the Czech Constitution, “in his/her deci-
sion-making, a judge is bound by the law and international agreements constitut-
ing part of the legal order; he/she is entitled to assess the conformity of a different 
legal regulation with the law or with such international agreement.” Article 87.1(d) 
and (i) of the Czech Constitution reads that “the Constitutional Court shall rule on 
[…] constitutional complaints filed against final decisions and other interventions 
by agencies of public authority, violating constitutionally guaranteed fundamental 
rights and freedoms” and “measures essential for the implementation of a ruling 
by an international court, which is binding for the Czech Republic, unless it can be 
implemented in a different manner.”51
According to § 118.1 of the Constitutional Court Act, 
if an international court finds that an obligation resulting for the Czech Republic from an 
international treaty has been infringed by the encroachment of a public authority, especially 
that, due to such an encroachment, a human right or fundamental freedom of a natural or 
Człowieka w Strasburgu może i powinno być uwzględniane przy interpretacji przepisów 
prawa polskiego.”
48 See e.g. Supreme Court cases: I BU 14/12 (3 April 2013); III UK 101/11 (22 May 2012); II KKN 
295/98 (9 November 1999). 
49 Cases: III AUz 476/13 (Szczecin Court of  Appeal, order, 16 December 2013); III AUa 413/13 
(Court of Appeal in Poznań, 1 August 2013). 
50 Case I OSK 1116/07 (Supreme Administrative Court, 2 September 2008). 
51 All quotations from: Office of the President of the Czech Republic, ‘Constitution of the CR’, 
<https://www.hrad.cz/en/czech-republic/constitution-of-the-cr> (access: 7 June 2016). 
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legal person was infringed, and if such infringement was based on a legal enactment in force, 
the government shall submit to the Court a petition proposing the annulment of such legal 
enactment, or individual provisions thereof, if there is no other way to assure it will be re-
pealed or amended. In such a case, § 35 para. 1 on the admissibility of petitions instituting 
a proceeding in matters which the Court has already decided, shall not apply.
Also, § 119 of the Constitutional Court Act provides for the possibility of re-
hearing the decision of the Constitutional Court,
should the Constitutional Court have decided in a matter in which an international court 
found that, as the result of the encroachment of a public authority, a human right or funda-
mental freedom was infringed in conflict with an international treaty.52 
In Ukraine the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body within the system 
of courts of general jurisdiction ensuring the uniformity of judicial practice in the 
procedure and manner prescribed by the procedural law.53 Since 2010 the decisions 
of  the Supreme Court of Ukraine in cases regarding different application of  the 
same provision of  the material law by the  cassation instance are  binding on all 
state authorities applying the law and on all courts.54 The constitution of Ukraine 
provides for the supremacy of  the ECHR over domestic statutory norms.55 Pur-
suant to Art. 17 of  the 2006 Law of Ukraine on the Enforcement of  Judgments 
and the Application of  the Case law of  the European Court of Human Rights,56 
“while adjudicating cases courts shall apply the Convention and the case law of the 
Court as a  source of  law.” According to the  Ukrainian Constitution, “the Con-
stitution of Ukraine has the highest legal force. Laws and other normative legal 
acts are adopted on the basis of  the Constitution of Ukraine and shall conform 
to it”,57 however “international treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine.”58 
52 Ibidem.   
53 Source: Supreme Court of  Ukraine, ‘About the  Supreme Court of  Ukraine’, <http://www.
scourt.gov.ua/clients/vsu/vsuen.nsf/(documents)/183E20947C3F5F67C2257ADB0031F80A> 
(access: 25 December 2015). 




55 A. Nussberger, ‘The Reception Process in Russia and Ukraine’, [in:] H. Keller, A. Stone Sweet 
(eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP 2008) 630. 
56 Law No. 3477-IV of 23 February 2006. 
57 Art. 8 of the Ukrainian Constitution. 
58 Art. 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution. It is not clear though whether the model of reception on 
international agreements in Ukraine is based on monism or dualism – see views quoted by 
I. Ilchenko, ‘The implementation of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights: Ukraine’s and Poland’s Governments prac-
tice’, [in:] M. Balcerzak et al. (eds), Europejska Konwencja Praw Człowieka i jej system kontrolny 
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In  2012, as reported by Nesterenko, “95% of  ECtHR decisions against Ukraine 
concerning the failure to observe the Convention standards were not implement-
ed and  the Committee of  Ministers’ proceedings were pending and, as regards 
the judicial practice, national judges in their vast majority [were] not using of the 
ECtHR’s practice because of  their ignorance, or [sought] to circumvent them.”59 
According to the ECtHR statistics, the Court delivered 1053 judgments in cases 
against Ukraine until 31 December 2015, finding at least one violation in 1036 
(most of them concerned right to a fair trial – 494, protection of property – 336, 
length of proceedings – 303 and right to liberty and security – 235).60
The Russian Federation accepted the jurisdiction of the ECtHR on 5 May 1998. 
Since then until 31 December 2015 the Court delivered 1720 decisions in cases 
against Russia,61 finding at least one violation in 1612 cases. The largest numbers 
of violations concerned Arts. 6, 3 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. 
Article 15(4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation reads that 
the universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties and agree-
ments of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system. If an interna-
tional treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged 
by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.62 
As regards the implementation of the Convention standard in cases other than 
the ones in which the ECtHR found a violation of  the Convention, the Russian 
Supreme Court adopted a sort of the guidelines for general courts,63 stating among 
others that:
a) the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights contained in the 
final judgments of the Court delivered in respect of the Russian Federation 
are obligatory for the courts;64
(Katedra Praw Człowieka, Wydział Prawa i  Administracji, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 
2011), p. 306. 
59 P. Nesterenko, ‘Some Issues Concerning Application of the Practice of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Ukraine’ (2012) 6 European Integration Studies, p. 43. 
60 Source: Council of Europe, ‘Violations by Article and respondent State 1959–2015, <http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2015_ENG.pdf> (access: 28 February 2016). 
61 The statistics provided here reflect the  state of  31 December 2015. Source: Council of  Eu-
rope, ‘Violations by Article and by State – 1959–2014’, <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Stats_violation_1959_2014_ENG.pdf> (access: 28 February 2016). 
62 See also: R. Petrov, P. Kalinichenko, ‘The Europeanization of  Third Country Judiciaries 
through the Application of the EU Acquis: The Cases of Russian and Ukraine’ (2011) 60 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 341. 
63 Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 21 on Ap-
plication of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
of 4 November 1950 and Protocols thereto by the Courts of General Jurisdiction <http://www.
supcourt.ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=9155> (access: 22 March 2015). 
64 However, in its ruling no. 21-P (14 July 2015), the Constitutional Court of the Russian Fed-
eration pointed out that neither the  European Convention, nor the  ECHR’s legal position 
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b) in order to effectively protect human rights, the courts take into considera-
tion the legal positions of the European Court expressed in its final judgments 
taken in respect of other States which are parties to the Convention. However 
this legal position is to be taken into consideration by court if the circum-
stances of the case under examination are similar to those which have been 
the subject of analysis and findings made by the European Court.65
However, in  December 2015 the  Russian Federation adopted the  new law66 
concerning the  implementation of  ECtHR rulings in  the Russia. According to 
this new law the Russian Federal Constitutional Court shall be competent to hear 
the  applications of  the government or the  President of  the Russian Federation 
concerning the implementation of the ECtHR decisions. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court then may either decide on the possibility of execution in whole or 
in  part, in  accordance with the  Constitution of  the Russian Federation, of  the 
decision of “interstate body for the protection of human rights and freedoms,” or 
on the impossibility of such execution. If the Constitutional Court adopts the lat-
ter decision any action (acts) aimed at the  fulfilment of  the relevant decisions 
of an interstate body for the protection of human rights and freedoms cannot be 
carried out in the Russian Federation.67 It means that neither individual domestic 
redress of applicants who obtained a judgment of the ECtHR adverse to Russia 
nor any future application of the standard arising from such ‘unenforceable’ de-
cisions are  permissible. This new law has already been applied by the  Russian 
Constitutional Court in  the case following up on the  ECtHR ruling Anchugov 
and Gladkov68 in which the Strasbourg Court held that the Russian constitutional 
in specific cases based on it can override the pre-eminence of the Constitution of the Rus-
sian Federation within the  Russian legal system and, therefore, will be implemented only 
subject to acknowledgment of the precedence of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
and added that the Russian Federation may derogate from its obligations related to enforce-
ment of a ruling of the ECHR as a contingency measure if such derogation is the only way to 
avoid violation of the fundamental principles and norms of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. 
65 Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 21 on Ap-
plication of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights… 
66 Federal Constitutional Law of 14 December 2015, N 7-FKZ, on Amendments to the Federal Con-
stitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Rus.: Федеральный 
конституционный закон от 14.12.2015 N. 7-ФКЗ “О внесении изменений в Федеральный 
конституционный закон ‘О Конституционном Суде Российской Федерации’”). 
67 Article 104(4) of the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Rus-
sian Federation as amended on 14 December 2015 reads that “b случае, если Конститу-
ционный Суд Российской Федерации принимает постановление, предусмотренное 
пунктом 2 части первой настоящей статьи, какие-либо действия (акты), направлен-
ные на исполнение соответствующего решения межгосударственного органа по 
защите прав и свобод человека, в Российской Федерации не могут осуществляться 
(приниматься).” 
68 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, App. nos 11157/04 and 16162/05 (ECtHR, 4 July 2013). 
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ban on prisoners’ voting rights69 was incompatible with Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to 
the ECHR. The ECtHR stressed that 
the Government’s argument that the  present case is  distinguishable from Hirst (no. 2), as 
in Russia a provision imposing a voting bar on convicted prisoners is laid down in the Con-
stitution – the basic law of Russia adopted following a nationwide vote – rather than in an 
‘ordinary’ legal instrument enacted by a parliament, as was the case in the United Kingdom 
[…]. In that connection the Court reiterates that, according to its established case law, a Con-
tracting Party is  responsible under Article 1 of  the Convention for all acts and omissions 
of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of do-
mestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations […]. Article 1 
makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any 
part of a member State’s ‘jurisdiction’ – which is often exercised in the first place through 
the Constitution – from scrutiny under Convention. The Court notes that this interpretation 
is in line with the principle set forth in Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.70 
The Russian Constitutional Court, at the request of the Minister of Justice, ruled 
that the ECtHR decision was unenforceable. It stressed that “Russia was and re-
mains an integral part of the European legal space, which implies equal dialogue 
and readiness to compromise. The Constitutional Court has always played a lead-
ing role in integrating the ECHR positions in the Russian legal system.”71 Howev-
er, although the “measures aimed at ensuring fairness, proportionality and aux-
iliary application of limits to the voting rights of convicted prisoners are possible 
and achievable in the Russian legislation and judicial practice in accordance with 
the ECtHR judgment”, “the Federal legislator has the right to optimize the system 
of criminal sanctions.”72 
The new Russian Law on the  ‘re-evaluation’ of  the ECtHR decisions was 
criticized by the Venice Commission73 who stressed that declaration of the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court on the  ‘unenforceability’ of  the ECtHR ruling does 
not eliminate international obligations binding upon Russia and that this new 
69 Article 32(3) of the Russian Constitution reads that “citizens recognized by court as legally 
unfit, as well as citizens kept in places of confinement by a court sentence shall be deprived 
of the right to elect and be elected.” 
70 Ibidem, para. 108. 
71 Case 12-П/2016 (Constitutional Court of  the Russian Federation, 19 April 2016) “по делу 
о разрешении вопроса о возможности исполнения в соответствии с Конституцией Рос-
сийской Федерации постановления Европейского Суда по правам человека от 4 июля 
2013 года по делу «Анчугов и Гладков против России» в связи с запросом Министерства 
юстиции Российской Федерации.”
72 Ibidem.
73 Interim opinion no. 832/2015 on the  amendments to the  Federal Constitutional Law on 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
106 Plenary Session, 11–12 March 2016; CDL-AD(2016)005.
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law is incompatible with Russia’s obligations under international law. The Ven-
ice Commission also recommended the  amendments to the  law governing 
the  Constitutional Court of  the Russian Federation including the  removal 
of the provision allowing the Constitutional Court to rule on the ‘enforceabil-
ity’ of  international decisions and  instead the  introduction of  a  provision al-
lowing this court to rule on the  compatibility of  a  ‘modality of  enforcement’ 
with the  Russian Constitution (save for situations where the  ECtHR specifi-
cally defined the measure of execution). Further, the Venice Commission rec-
ommended that the Russian Constitutional Court makes clear that assessment 
of constitutionality does not extend to individual measures of execution such as 
the payment of just satisfaction. Finally, where the Constitutional Court rules 
on the  unconstitutionality of  a  particular measure of  enforcement, executive 
authorities should be obliged to find alternative measures of enforcement, in-
cluding amendment of legislative framework, including the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation. 
In Lithuania, under Art. 104 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania 
judges of  the Constitutional Court should ‘follow the  Constitution’, Art.  135(1) 
of the Constitution assumes the duty of observance of international law by nation-
al courts and Art. 138(3) of the Constitution makes international treaties ratified 
by the Seimas a constituent part of the Lithuanian legal system. The latter provi-
sion constitutes normative basis of  i.a. the dialogue of  the Constitutional Court 
with the ECtHR. The ECHR is the international treaty most frequently referred 
to by the Constitutional Court – mentioned around 50 times so far.74 The Court 
recognised the identical nature of values forming the foundations of the Conven-
tion and  the Lithuanian constitution and  the identity of  their goals in  the area 
of human rights.75
As regards Hungary, its 2011 Constitution reads that “Hungary shall contribute 
to the creation of European unity”76 and “Hungary shall ensure that Hungarian law 
be in conformity with international law.”77 The jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary includes the review of “any legal regulation for conflict with any 
international treaties.”78 
74 National Report of Lithuania for the XVIth Congress of the Conference of European Constitu-
tional Courts 5 and 6. 
75 The Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s conclusion of 24 January 1995. See also broadly in the 
contribution by E. Kuzborska in this book. 
76 Article E.1 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
77 Article Q.2 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
78 Article 24.2.f of the Hungarian Constitution. 
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2.3. Reopening of Proceedings Following an Adverse Ruling 
of the ECtHR
There are, in principle, three types of consequences to States Parties after an 
adverse ruling from the ECtHR: 
(1) to pay the awarded compensation; 
(2) if necessary, to take further individual measures in favour of the applicant, 
that is to put a stop to a violation found by the Court and to place the appli-
cant, as far as possible, into the situation existing before the breach (restitutio 
in integrum);79 and 
(3) to take measures of  a  general character in  order to ensure non-repetition 
of similar violations in the future80 (in case of pilot judgments or quasi-pilot 
judgments81). 
Pursuant to Arts. 1 and 46 ECHR, the High Contracting Parties shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Con-
vention and  they undertake to abide by the  final judgment of  the Court in any 
case to which they are parties. It means in particular that any judgment finding 
the violation of the Convention should, in principle and where it is possible, lead 
to the restitutio in integrum.82 
As a  matter of  principle, after an adverse judgment of  the ECtHR in  a  case 
against Poland, the proceedings that resulted in stating the violation should be reo-
pened. This is a normative framework for the most elementary foundations of the 
dialogue with the ECtHR. The procedural codes (Code of Criminal Procedure, 
79 Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland 2, App. no. 32772/02 (ECtHR, 30 June 
2009), para. 89. 
80 Broniowski v Poland, App. no. 31443/96 (ECtHR, 22 June 2004), para. 193. 
81 Quasi pilot judgments or pilot-like judgments are those where ECtHR finds a systemic vio-
lation but abstains from ordering the adoption of general measures. Wizerkaniuk v Poland, 
App. no. 18990/05 (ECtHR, 5 July 2011) can serve as example, where the Court ruled para 
84 that “the Press Act was adopted in 1984, twenty-seven years ago. It was adopted before 
the collapse of the communist system in Poland in 1989. Under that system, all media were 
subjected to preventive censorship. The Press Act 1984 was extensively amended on twelve 
occasions (see paragraph 29 above). However, the provisions of sections 14 and 49 of that 
Act, on which the applicant’s conviction was based, were never subject to any amendments, 
in spite of the profound political and legal changes occasioned by Poland’s transition to de-
mocracy. It is not for the Court to speculate about the reasons why the Polish legislature has 
chosen not to repeal those provisions. However, the Court cannot but note that, as applied 
in the present case, the provisions cannot be said to be compatible with the tenets of a dem-
ocratic society and with the significance that freedom of expression assumes in the context 
of such a society.” See also: I.C. Kamiński, R. Kownacki, K. Wierczyńska, ‘Wykonywanie orzec-
zeń Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w  polskim systemie prawnym’, [in:] A. Wró-
bel (ed.), Zapewnienie efektywności orzeczeń sądów międzynarodowych w polskim porządku 
prawnym (Wolters Kluwer 2011) 101 and cases mentioned there. 
82 See: O. Ichim, Just Satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights (Cambridge 
2015), p. 2.
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Code of Civil Procedure, the Law on the Procedure before Administrative Courts) 
regulate the problem of re-opening of proceedings differently. The Code of Crim-
inal Procedure provides explicitly that “the proceedings shall be re-opened to 
the benefit of the accused where such need arises from the decision of an interna-
tional body acting under international treaty ratified by the Republic of Poland.”83 
Moreover, the  re-opening is  not limited to the  accused who actually applied to 
the ECtHR and obtained the  judgment but it is extended to “other cases where 
a  violation of  the Convention occurred in  the construction of  factual and  legal 
circumstances identical to the one which was found in the judgment of the ECtHR 
adverse to Poland”84 as the Supreme Court rightly held basing its argumentation 
on Art. 1 ECHR. However, where the accused was sentenced for sanction other 
than unconditional deprivation of liberty, the violation of the ECHR does not con-
stitute sufficient grounds of admissibility of cassation complaint as the latter would 
be inadmissible in such circumstances if not brought by the Minister of Justice, 
Prosecutor General or the Ombudsman.85 
The Law on the Procedure before Administrative Courts contains provisions 
similar to the Code of Criminal Procedure, although the right to plead for re-open-
ing is open to every party to the proceedings.86 
However, the  Code of  Civil Procedure does not provide for the  possibility 
of  re-opening of  proceedings following the  adverse judgment of  the ECtHR.87 
The resolution of 7 judges of the Supreme Court88 held that “the final judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights finding the violation of the right to fair 
83 Art. 540(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
84 Case 14/14 (Supreme Court, resolution of  7 judges, 26 June 2014): “potrzeba wznowienia 
postępowania, o  której mowa w  Art.  540(3) k.p.k., może dotyczyć nie tylko postępowania 
w  sprawie, do  której odnosi  się rozstrzygnięcie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
o  naruszeniu Konwencji o  ochronie praw człowieka i  podstawowych wolności, ale także 
do  innych postępowań karnych, w  których zaistniało naruszenie postanowień Konwencji 
tożsame w układzie okoliczności faktyczno-prawnych do stwierdzonego w orzeczeniu tego 
Trybunału wydanym przeciwko Polsce.”
85 See: Art. 523(2) and (4) and Art. 521(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The official title 
of the Polish Ombudsman is “the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights” (Rzecznik Praw Obywa-
telskich), see: Sejm, ‘The Constitution of the Republic of Poland’, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/
prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm> (access: 16 December 2016). 
86 Art. 272(3) of the Law on the Procedure before Administrative Courts (“można żądać wzno-
wienia postępowania również w przypadku, gdy potrzeba taka wynika z rozstrzygnięcia orga-
nu międzynarodowego działającego na podstawie umowy międzynarodowej ratyfikowanej 
przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską”). 
87 As rightly pointed out by P. Grzegorczyk, “The decision to allow for annulment of the final 
and valid judgment following the judgment of the ECtHR lays within the power of the legis-
lature” in P. Grzegorczyk, ‘Naruszenie art. 6 ust. 1 Europejskiej Konwencji o Ochronie Praw 
Człowieka jako podstawa wznowienia postępowania cywilnego z  powodu nieważności’ 
(2011) 3 Radca Prawny, p. 83. 
88 Case III CZP 16/10 (Supreme Court, resolution of 7 judges, 30 November 2010). See the com-
ment in A. Paprocka, ‘Glosa do uchwały SN z dnia 30 listopada 2010 r., III CZP 16/10’ (2011) 
7 Państwo i Prawo 153. 
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trial before the  court guaranteed by Art.  6 § 1 ECHR […] shall not constitute 
the ground of re-opening of the civil proceedings.”89 The Supreme Court analysed 
the case law of the ECtHR and found that the ECHR does not require the re-open-
ing of proceedings in civil cases although the restitutio in integrum is highly de-
sired90 and added that the ECtHR does not tend to find violations of Art. 6(1) ECHR 
where legislation in a State Party does not provide for a possibility of re-opening 
of proceedings.91 
Moreover, where the ECtHR finds a violation resulting from certain provisions 
of  Polish law (normative violation), even in  a  pilot judgment procedure, such 
ECtHR judgment is not treated as a preliminary ruling opening path for claims 
of compensation for normative injustice (as Art. 4171 of the Polish Civil Code re-
quires that the plaintiff in a case concerning compensation for normative injustice 
constisting of the adoption of normatively defective provisionsfirst obtains a pre-
liminary ruling finding that certain provision violated a higher-ranked norm).92
According to Art. 46 ECHR States are bound to abide by final judgments where 
the ECtHR found a violation of the Convention. It means that they are obliged to 
put an end to the violation immediately. This obligation may be – depending on 
the  circumstances –  binding also upon domestic courts, if national procedures 
allow them to put an end to the violation in their decisions. Sometimes one is not 
required to re-open the proceedings. This is the case, if the violation of the Con-
vention still exists and can be remedied by ex-post decision of a national court. 
89 Polish: “ostateczny wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, w którym stwierdzono 
naruszenie prawa do  sprawiedliwego rozpatrzenia sprawy przez sąd, zagwarantowanego 
w art. 6 ust. 1 konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności, sporządzonej 
dnia 4 listopada 1950 r. w Rzymie (Dz.U. z 1993 r. Nr 61, poz. 284 ze zm.), nie stanowi podstawy 
wznowienia postępowania cywilnego.”
90 See in this respect Bouchan v Ukraine, App. no. 22251/08 (ECtHR, 5 February 2015). 
91 Polish: “charakterystyczne jest poza tym, że Trybunał ostrzej traktuje te państwa, które wpro-
wadziły do swego systemu prawnego wyraźną podstawę wznowienia postępowania cywil-
nego w związku z jego wyrokiem. W takich wypadkach, jak to wynika z orzecznictwa Trybu-
nału, do sankcji dochodzi ze względu na niewłaściwe zastosowanie przepisów regulujących 
to postępowanie, natomiast państwom, które tego nie uczyniły, nie wytyka  się ponownie 
naruszenia art. 6 ust. 1 konwencji jedynie dlatego, że do wznowienia postępowania, mimo 
określonego wyroku Trybunału, nie doszło.”
92 Case I CSK 577/11 (Supreme Court, 14 June 2012) where the Supreme Court ruled that “os-
tateczny wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka wydany w sprawie ze skargi indy-
widualnej przeciwko Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, stwierdzający naruszenie przez Polskę art. 1 
protokołu 1 do  Konwencji o  ochronie praw człowieka i  podstawowych wolności (prawo 
do poszanowania mienia) w związku z utrzymywaniem przez polskiego ustawodawcę szere-
gu regulacji prawnych, które ograniczały prawo własności właścicieli nieruchomości, w tym 
uniemożliwiały swobodne ustalenie poziomu czynszów, nie jest tożsamy ze stwierdzeniem 
niezgodności aktu normatywnego z Konstytucją, ratyfikowaną umową międzynarodową lub 
ustawą w rozumieniu art. 417[1]§ 1 k.c.” This judgment was criticised by K. Wójtowicz in ‘Glo-
sa do wyroku SN z dnia 14 czerwca 2012 r., I CSK 577/11’ (2013) 1 Zeszyty Naukowe Sądow-
nictwa Administracyjnego, p. 173. 
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However, one may provide example where Polish courts encountered troubles 
with this seemingly simple consequence of Art. 46 ECHR. 
On 29 July 2008 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment 
in Choumakov (no. 1)93 and found that the applicant’s detention exceeded a rea-
sonable time. The  applicant’s lawyer requested the  Provincial Court in  Elbląg 
to release the applicant – as detention should be waived at any time if circum-
stances occur justifying such waiver.94 He invoked in  this respect the  decision 
of the ECtHR. On 5 December 2008 the Elbląg Provincial Court refused the ap-
plicant’s lawyer’s request. The Court considered that the grounds for the appli-
cant’s detention remained valid (thus it disregarded the findings of the ECtHR) 
and, therefore, the continued detention of the applicant did not violate the pro-
cedural guarantees safeguarded by Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR (contrary to the finding 
of the ECtHR). As regards the ECtHR judgment, the Provincial Court expressed 
the  opinion that neither the  Convention nor the  Code of  Criminal Procedure 
placed an obligation on the court to release an applicant following a  judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights. The Provincial Court noted that the ap-
plicant had been granted 1,500 euros (EUR), which constituted sufficient just 
satisfaction for the  violation found. The  Gdańsk Appellate Court while hear-
ing the  appeal from that decision added that the  judgment of  the ECtHR was 
of a  “declaratory nature” and “did not constitute a  source of  law but rather an 
application of the law.”95 Obviously, the decision of the domestic courts should be 
different. Since the ECtHR found that the continued detention of the applicant 
violated the Convention, the only lawful decision of the domestic court should 
be to release the applicant immediately (provided that no new circumstances oc-
curred – as it was in this case). 
As for assuring conformity with Art.  46 ECHR, the  Russian Federation en-
countered problems with the restitutio in integrum. Before 2010 in Russia although 
the re-opening of different types of court proceedings has certain common features, 
re-opening further to an ECtHR judgment is not regulated in a uniform manner. 
Most importantly, unlike the Commercial Procedure Code and the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code does not expressly provide a ground for 
the re-opening a case on the basis of an ECtHR judgment. As a result, the Russian 
courts had been dismissing requests to re-open court proceedings, until the matter 
was raised by the Constitutional Court who found96 that
93 Choumakov v Poland, App. no. 33868/05 (ECtHR, 29 July 2008). 
94 Art. 253(1) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Preventive measure should be changed or 
waived if circumstances justifying its application cease to exist and/or if circumstances occur 
justifying it change or waiver.”
95 See: Choumakov v Poland, App. no. 55777/08 (ECtHR, 1 February 2011), paras 18–21. 
96 Case 4-P (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 26 February 2010) in a case con-
cerning the review of the constitutionality of Art. 392(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure in con-
nection with complaints lodged by A.A. Doroshok, A.Ye. Kot and Ye.Yu. Fedotova. 
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Russia’s obligations to enforce ECtHR judgments under the Convention include the adop-
tion of individual and general measures, where required […]. A person whose rights were 
found by the ECtHR to be breached should have an opportunity to have his or her case 
re-examined by the  national courts. Therefore, the  lack of  a  provision in  the Civil Pro-
cedure Code could not justify the  refusal to re-open proceedings, especially considering 
that the Commercial Procedure Code did provide for the possibility of such a re-opening 
in  commercial proceedings. There is  no objective reason for the  discrepancies between 
the Commercial Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code in this respect. The courts 
of general jurisdiction should have applied relevant provisions of the Commercial Proce-
dure Code by analogy when deciding on the issue of re-opening proceedings. Furthermore, 
the Constitutional Court stated that the  implementation of national procedures ensuring 
that national judicial decisions were re-examined in view of violations of the Convention 
would be an appropriate general measure in this situation. Therefore, the Civil Procedure 
Code should be amended accordingly.97 
In consequence of  the judgment of  the Constitutional Court of Russia, pur-
suant to the Art. 392(4)(4) of  the Russian Civil Procedural Code (as amended), 
“effective judicial decisions may be reviewed due to newly discovered or new facts”, 
whereas one of  the new facts is “establishing by the European Court of Human 
Rights a violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms when trying by a court the specific case in connection with 
whose solving the applicant has filed a petition with the European Court of Hu-
man Rights.”98 Article 392(4)(4) of  the Russian Civil Procedural Code was later 
reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which held that 
should court of general jurisdiction come to the conclusion about impossibility of execution 
of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights without recognition as not con-
forming to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of legislative provisions, concerning 
which the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation earlier established absence of vi-
olation by them of constitutional rights of the petitioner in a concrete case, it is entitled to 
suspend proceeding and petition the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with 
a request to review constitutionality of these legislative provisions.99 
97 Both citations from M. Issaeva, I. Sergeeva, M. Suchkova, ‘Enforcement of  the Judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia: Recent Developments and Current Chal-
lenges’ (2011) 15 International Journal of Human Rights, <http://www.surjournal.org/eng/
conteudos/getArtigo15.php?artigo=15,artigo_04.htm> (access: 15 March 2015) 67. 
98 The Russian Civil Procedural Code, ‘Civil Procedural Code’, <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lex-
docs/laws/en/ru/ru081en.pdf> (access: 22 March 2015). 
99 Judgment of  the Constitutional Court of  the Russian Federation No. 27-П of  6 December 
2013, <http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Decision/Judgments/Documents/2013%20December%20
6%2027-P.pdf> (access: 22 March 2015) – exact quotation from the website of  the Russian 
Constitutional Court. See also the  comment in  G. Vaypan, ‘Acquiescence affirmed, its lim-
its left undefined: The Markin judgment and the pragmatism of the Russian Constitutional 
Court vis-à-vis the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) 3 Russian Law Journal Vol. II 130. 
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In Hungary, the reopening of criminal proceedings after an adverse judgment 
of ECtHR is possible in favour of the defendant if the ECtHR found “that the con-
duct of the proceedings or the final decision of the court” violated the Conven-
tion.100 The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for the reopening of proceed-
ings following an adverse judgment of the ECtHR.101 In Czech Republic the retrial 
after the ECtHR judgment is possible in all types of cases.102 The same applies to 
Ukraine where the “appeal in the light of exceptional circumstances” is provided, 
however, as the Bochan (no. 2) case103 illustrates, one may encounter impediments 
while using this instrument. 
3. The Forms of Judicial Dialogue of the CEE 
States’ Courts with the ECtHR Classified 
vis-à-vis the Criterion of Appropriateness
After this short overview of national provisions and decisions of  the high-
est national judicial authorities of  the CEE States concerning the  observance 
of  the ECtHR case law, one could reasonably assume that the  practice of  do-
mestic courts would smoothly implement the  paradigm of  judicial dialogue 
with the ECtHR. This section is focused on the verification of this assumption. 
It proves that the practice of national courts in  the selected CEE States varies 
as regards the  criterion of  appropriateness of  judicial dialogue. The  following 
100 Pursuant to para. 406.1.b of the Criminal Procedure Code of Hungary, “terhelt javára felül-
vizsgálatnak van helye akkor is, ha nemzetközi szerzödéssel létrehozott emberi jogi szerv 
megállapította, hogy az eljárás lefolytatása vagy a  bíróság jogerös határozata megsértette 
a törvényben kihirdetett nemzetközi szerzödés valamely rendelkezését, feltéve, hogy a nem-
zetközi emberi jogi szerv joghatóságának a Magyar Köztársaság alávetette magát és a felül-
vizsgálattal a jogsértés orvosolható.” 
101 See: Arts. 270–275 of the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure. 
102 See: I. Pospíšil, Comments on Reopening Proceedings in the Civil Matters after the ECtHR Judg-
ments before the  Constitutional Court of  the Czech Republic (Strasbourg 2015) available at 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documen-
tId=09000016805921c9> (access: 24 April 2016). 
103 Bochan v Ukraine, App. no. 22251/08 (ECtHR, 5 February 2015). In this case, following the ECtHR 
judgment adverse to Ukraine, the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an “appeal in the 
light of  exceptional circumstances” pursuant in  particular to Articles 353–355 of  the Code 
of Civil Procedure of 2004. She asked the Supreme Court to quash the courts’ decisions in her 
case and to adopt a new judgment allowing her claims in full. She joined to her appeal copies 
of the Court’s judgment and of the domestic decisions. However, the Supreme Court in dis-
missed the applicant’s motion holding in particular that the European Court of Human Rights 
had concluded that the [domestic] courts’ decisions were lawful and well-founded. 
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subsections present examples of proper, fake and failed dialogue as well as such 
decisions of domestic courts, which are non-classifiable in view of the precon-
ceived criterion. 
3.1. The Proper Dialogue: Implementing the ECHR Standard 
by Domestic Courts or Consciously Questioning it after 
Thorough Analysis
Proper judicial dialogue exists when national courts either follow the interpre-
tative standard of the Convention by actually implementing the ECtHR case law 
or when they dissent or concur with the Strasbourg Court after thorough analysis 
of the jurisprudence of the latter. Several examples of such practice will be men-
tioned below. 
For obvious linguistic reasons Polish score of successful dialogue may appear 
to be the highest, however this impression results only from poor opportunities 
of accessing the databases of judgments in other CEE States. The same caveat shall 
apply to other types of dialogue classified in this chapter. 
3.1.1. Poland
Trifling cases and the access to justice
In Poland the Supreme Administrative Court decided104 to refer to the extended 
panel of 7 judges of the Supreme Administrative Court105 in order to obtain resolution 
on whether an administrative court may dismiss the case as inadmissible when it con-
stitutes an abuse of a right of access to the court because it concerns a matter which 
is transparently and flagrantly trifling (trivial). The Supreme Administrative Court 
referred quite extensively to the case law of the ECtHR developed under Art. 6 ECHR, 
quoting the ECtHR decision in Korolev106 and the judgment in Gagliano Giorgi.107
The case in which the Supreme Administrative Court requested the resolution 
of the panel of 7 judges arose in the circumstances where the applicant disputed 
the obligation to pay 0.42 PLN for the copy of documents whereas only the costs 
of legal aid (paid by the State Treasury) amounted to 516.60 PLN and they would 
have increased were the new proceedings to commence. In spite of all doubts as 
104 Case I OSK 1992/14 (Supreme Administrative Court, order, 16 October 2015). 
105 Art. 187(1) of the Law on the Procedure before Administrative Courts allows the panel hear-
ing a case to refer to the extended panel of 7 judges of the SAC in order to obtain a resolution 
on a legal issue raising difficulties in the case law. 
106 Korolev v  Russia, App. no. 25551/05 (ECtHR, decision as to the  admissibility, 1 July 2010). 
The decision was delivered right after the entry into force of Protocol No. 14, which amended 
Art. 35 ECHR by adding that the case shall be declared inadmissible if the applicant has not 
suffered a significant disadvantage. The Court explained that in accordance with the prin-
ciple de minimis non curat pretor an application must concern circumstances which show 
a “minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court.”
107 Gagliano Giorgi v Italy, App. no. 23563/07 (ECtHR, 5 March 2012), paras 51–66. 
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to whether the standard developed by the ECtHR in relation to assessment of ad-
missibility of applications brought under Art. 35 ECHR can be directly applied 
to cases before national courts, one must note that the reference of the Court to 
the ECtHR jurisprudence was extensive and accurate. The Supreme Administra-
tive Court highlighted the  need of  adjudication without an unnecessary delay, 
invoking in this respect Philis (No. 2)108 and insisted that Art. 6 ECHR “imposes 
on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way 
that their courts can meet each of  its requirements, including the obligation to 
hear cases within a reasonable time” and considered that adjudicating in trifling 
cases creates a workload which compromises the possibility of promptness of pro-
ceedings. The  Court referred to the  ECtHR judgments concerning the  delayed 
proceedings in Poland (Kudła,109 Beller110 and Rutkowski111) and considered that 
the standard of the Convention allows for drawing negative consequences from 
the  abuse of  the right of  access to the  court, quoting in  this respect Winer,112 
W.  v  Germany113 and  Stewart-Brady114 and  finally Bock115 which was discussed 
in greater details. Unfortunately the panel of seven judges refused to adopt a res-
olution116 for formal reasons. Namely, the issue of admissibility of the application 
in the material case was already reviewed by the Court ex officio since the case at 
hand had already been decided by the same Court in 2013.117 If the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court decided in 2013 that the case was admissible, this conclusion 
binds itself and the Regional Administrative Court.118 However, engagement with 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR by the Court when requesting for the resolution 
of the panel of 7 judges was rather impressive. Its reasoning attempted to trans-
fer the France-rooted concept of pas d’intérêt, pas d’action, which was integrated 
in the Convention practice by the ECtHR, to the framework of the Polish admin-
istrative courts’ procedure. 
108 Philis v Greece, App. no. 19773/92 (ECtHR, 27 June 1997). 
109 Kudła v Poland, App. no. 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000).
110 Beller v Poland, App. no. 51837/99 (ECtHR, 1 February 2005). 
111 Rutkowski and  others v  Poland, App. nos 72287/10, 13927/11 and  46187/11 (ECtHR, 7 July 
2015). 
112 Winer v United Kingdom, App. no. 10871/84 (ECtHR 10 July 1986). 
113 W. v Federal Republic of Germany, App. no. 11564/85 (European Commission of Human Rights, 
decision, 4 December 1985). 
114 Stewart-Brady v United Kingdom, App. no. 28406/95 (European Commission of Human Rights, 
decision, 2 July 1997). The name of the applicant was misspelled by the SAC (“Steward” in-
stead of “Stewart”). 
115 Bock v Germany, App. no. 22051/07 (ECtHR, admissibility decision, 19 January 2010). 
116 Case I OPS 3/15 (Supreme Administrative Court, order, 21 March 2016). 
117 Case I OSK 2139/13 (Supreme Administrative Court, 1 October 2013). 
118 By virtue of  Art.  170 of  Law on Procedure before Administrative Courts, the  final decision 
of the court is binding upon this court and other courts and bodies of the State. 
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Freedom of assembly
The Polish Law on Assemblies was recently amended119 resulting most prob-
ably in one of the most liberal regulations on the continent. Before it happened 
Poland had encountered turbulences in the area protected by Art. 11 ECHR.120 
It is a well-settled case law of the ECtHR that a State is the ultimate guarantor 
of the principle of political pluralism. The genuine and effective respect for free-
dom of association and assembly cannot be reduced to a mere duty on the part 
of the State not to interfere. A purely negative conception would not be compat-
ible with the purpose of Art. 11 ECHR, nor with that of the Convention in gen-
eral. There exists, thus, a positive obligation to secure the effective enjoyment 
of these freedoms.121 Therefore, a risk of disorder or threat to public safety is not, 
as such, an ultimate justification for any interference with the  freedom of as-
sembly.122 The Supreme Administrative Court123 properly construed provisions 
of  the (at that time in  force) Law of Assembly of 1990 and  invoked the Fáber 
decision of the ECtHR,124 and stated that “organs of the state are obliged to as-
sess the  risks to safety and  risk of  interference and  then to apply appropriate 
measures determined by that assessment. These measures must be the least re-
strictive and  –  as a  matter of  principle –  enable to organise the  assembly.”125 
The case law of the Strasbourg Court was invoked properly in order to establish 
119 Law on Assembly adopted on 24 July 2015, O.J. 2015, item 1485. However, the Law was 
amended yet again in 2016, which resulted in substantial departure from the Convention 
standard. 
120 See: Bączkowski v Poland, App. no. 1543/06 (ECtHR, 3 May 2007). 
121 Ibidem, para. 64. 
122 See also: Case K 21/05 (Polish Constitutional Court, 18 January 2006). 
123 Case I OSK 2538/13 (Supreme Administrative Court, 10 January 2014). 
124 Fáber v  Hungary, App. no. 40721/08 (ECtHR, 24 July 2012). The  case concerned the  viola-
tion of  Art.  10 read in  the light of  Art.  11 ECHR. Mr. Fáber was held for 6 hours in  custody 
and fined some 200 EUR for disobedience since he protested against the adjacent manifes-
tation of the Hungarian Socialist Party and while doing so he was holding the Árpád-striped 
flag. The ECtHR concluded that although the police’s endeavour to prevent any clashes be-
tween the participants in the two assemblies falls within the authorities’ margin of appreci-
ation granted in the prevention of violence and in the protection of demonstrators against 
fear of  violence, nevertheless, the  freedom to take part in  a  peaceful assembly is  of such 
importance that it cannot be restricted in any way, so long as the person concerned does not 
himself commit any reprehensible act on such an occasion and “in the absence of additional 
elements, the Court, even accepting the provocative nature of the display of the flag, which 
remains prima facie an act of freedom of expression, cannot see the reasons for the interven-
tion against the applicant.” According to the ECtHR, “where demonstrators do not engage 
in acts of violence, it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of toler-
ance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
Convention is not to be deprived of all substance” (para. 47 of the judgment). 
125 In  Polish: “organy zobligowane są do  dokonania oceny zagrożenia dla  bezpieczeństwa 
oraz ryzyka zakłóceń, a następnie zastosowania odpowiednich środków dyktowanych przez 
ocenę takiego ryzyka. Środki te – jak podkreślił Trybunał – powinny być najmniej ogranicza-
jące i – co do zasady – umożliwiać przeprowadzenie demonstracji.” 
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the  interpretative consensus concerning Art. 11 ECHR and thus the Supreme 
Administrative Court properly ‘took into account’ the  ECtHR jurisprudence 
while interpreting domestic law. It was, therefore, a good example of a proper 
judicial dialogue: not only did the Court properly identify the relevant case law 
of the ECtHR but also it did manage to apply the relevant jurisprudence in the 
case at hand. 
The duty of authorisation of statements made in interviews
In Wizerkaniuk case,126 concerning the  journalists’ duty of  authorisation 
of  statements made in  interviews before they are published, the ECtHR ex-
plained that “an obligation to verify, before publication, whether a text based 
on statements made in the context of an interview and quoted verbatim is ac-
curate can be said to amount, for the printed media, to a normal obligation 
of  professional diligence”127 and  found that the  criminal conviction of  the 
journalist “without any regard being had to the accuracy and subject matter 
of the published text and notwithstanding his unquestioned diligence in en-
suring that the  text of  the published interview corresponded to the  actual 
statements […], was disproportionate in  the circumstances.”128 The  Provin-
cial Court in Sieradz referred to this ruling in a  case of  journalist who was 
convicted by the first instance court for disregarding the request of the inter-
viewee who insisted on authorisation of the interview. The Provincial Court 
emphasised that although the law (imposing the authorisation duty) was for-
mally breached, yet, the  proceedings should be discontinued because “even 
though the accused formally violated Art. 14.2 of the Press Law,129 neverthe-
less the level of social noxiousness was insignificant”130 as the journalist quot-
ed the  statements made by the  interviewee verbatim. The  Provincial Court 
properly noted and drew conclusions from the factual similarities of the case 
at hand and the circumstances, which appeared crucial for the Wizerkaniuk 
ruling of  the ECtHR. It  emphasized the key similarities of  the case at hand 
and the Wizerkaniuk case stressing that “statements made by the injured party 
by e-mail were quoted in the disputed press material without any shortcuts or 
deformations. The accused in no way manipulated these statements.”131 Thus 
the  Provincial Court managed to reflect the  essential elements of  the EC-
tHR reasoning in the circumstances of the case decided. The crucial element 
identified and transposed by the Provincial Court from the Strasbourg acquis 
126 Wizerkaniuk v Poland, App. no. 18990/05 (ECtHR, 5 July 2011). 
127 Ibidem, para. 66. 
128 Ibidem, para. 87. 
129 This provision introduces the duty of authorisation. 
130 Case II Ka 71/15 (Provincial Court in Sieradz, 22 April 2015). 
131 In Polish: “wypowiedzi udzielone drogą mailową przez oskarżycielkę posiłkową zostały zacy-
towane w opublikowanym artykule bez żadnych skrótów i zniekształceń. Oskarżona w żaden 
sposób nie manipulowała tymi wypowiedziami.”
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was the  issue of  imposition of  a  sanction in  case of  a  purely formal breach 
of the authorisation duty. This judgment serves, therefore, as a good example 
of a proper judicial dialogue. 
Eviction
In cases concerning eviction the defendants quite frequently invoke Art. 8 
ECHR claiming that the  right to inviolability of  the home was infringed. 
The ECtHR in  its case law132 accepted that eviction, which “benefits the eco-
nomic well-being of  the country” may be regarded as serving the  ‘legitimate 
aim’ which is required in case of interference with the right to inviolability of the 
home. The Provincial Court of Gliwice133 invoked the Kryvitska ruling and cer-
tain other decisions of  the ECtHR proprio motu while assessing the  legality 
of eviction ordered by the first instance court. It is noteworthy that the appel-
lants did not raise pleas in law alleging the violation of Art. 8 ECHR. However, 
the Provincial Court found it appropriate to evaluate the decision of the lower 
court against the background of the provision of the ECHR. This form of ref-
erence to the case law of the ECtHR is particularly valuable since it shows that 
the court was aware of its role of guarantor of effectiveness of the Convention 
and  knew that it ought to evaluate the  compatibility of  domestic provisions 
with the Convention standard even in the absence of invitation to do so from 
the parties to the proceedings. 
3.1.2. Other CEE States
The Czech Constitutional Court frequently refers to the case law of the ECtHR, 
thus implementing the relevant standards of protection. One can point out at sev-
eral examples. 
In the judgment 2005/03/15 – I. ÚS 367/03 resulting from the constitutional 
complaint of Mr. J.R., the Czech Constitutional Court decided that “the 25 July 
2002 judgment of  the High Court in  Prague, no. 1 Co  106/2002–69, and  the 
24 April 2003 judgment of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, no. 28 Cdo 
2194/2002-89, resulted in  a  violation of  the complainant’s fundamental rights 
and  basic freedoms flowing from Art.  17(2) of  the Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights and Basic Freedoms and from Art. 10 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” and they were therefore quashed. 
The  complainant, in  an interview for the  daily newspaper, Lidové noviny, ex-
pressed an opinion, which is based on the  fact that in  the 70’s and 80’s of  the 
previous century, the  field of  popular music was restricted politically (and he 
employed for this purpose, and with a certain degree of exaggeration, the term 
‘mafia’). The clue of the case was to decide on the degree to which public figures 
132 Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v Ukraine, App. No. 30856/03 (ECtHR, 2 December 2010), para. 46. 
133 Case III Ca 727/14 (Provincial Court in Gliwice, 1 October 2014). 
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must bear criticism. The Constitutional Court recalled the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR stating among others that 
where some statement constitutes a value judgment, the appropriateness of the interference 
with the rights of personhood can depend upon whether there exists a sufficient factual ba-
sis for the contested statement, since even a value judgment can be excessive, if it lacks any 
factual basis whatsoever [compare the decisions of  the European Court of Human Rights 
in the matter, De Haes a Gijsels v Belgium (1997) and Oberschlick v Austria (No. 2) (1997)].134 
It further explained that 
the Constitutional Court concurs with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights according to which the  freedom of  expression represents one of  the most impor-
tant foundations of democratic society and one of the main conditions of the advancement 
and development of each individual. As such the freedom of expression relates not only to 
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or considered as innocuous or insignifi-
cant, but even those which injure, shock, or disturb: such is required for pluralism, tolerance, 
and a spirit of openness, without which there would be no democratic society. Compare, for 
example, the decision, Fuentes Bobo v Spain (2000).135 
The Court concluded that “persons who are active in  the public, politicians, 
public officials, media stars etc., must bear a greater degree of criticism than oth-
er citizens. The  jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human Rights is  also 
built upon this principle [in greater detail, for example, in the matter of Lingens 
v Austria (1986)].” If one keeps in mind the Oberschlick (No. 2) standard (‘idiot’) 
and compares it to the circumstance of this case (‘mafia’), then one has to conclude 
that the Constitutional Court managed to guarantee the sufficient level of protec-
tion of the freedom of expression. 
In the judgment 2008/10/14 – Pl. ÚS 40/06 concerning the obligatory mem-
bership in  Czech Medical Chamber the  Constitutional Court developed thor-
ough analysis of the ECtHR case law concerning the negative aspect of the right 
134 Case I. ÚS 367/03 (Czech Constitutional Court, 15 March 2005) 5. In Czech: “Tam, kde je nějaké 
prohlášení hodnotovým soudem, může přiměřenost zásahu do  osobnostních práv záviset 
na tom, zda existuje dostatečný faktický podklad pro napadené prohlášení, protože i hodno-
tový soud, bez jakéhokoli faktického podkladu, může být přehnaný [srov. rozhodnutí Evrop-
ského soudu pro lidská práva ve věcech De Haes a Gijsels proti Belgii (1997) a Oberschlick proti 
Rakousku (č. 2) (1997)].”
135 Ibidem, 6. In Czech: “Ústavní soud se ztotožňuje s judikaturou Evropského soudu pro lidská 
práva, podle níž svoboda projevu představuje jeden z nejdůležitějších základů demokratické 
společnosti a jednu z hlavních podmínek pokroku a rozvoje každého jednotlivce. Jako taková 
se svoboda projevu vztahuje nejen na ‘informace’ nebo ‘myšlenky’ příznivě přijímané či po-
važované za neškodné či bezvýznamné, ale i na ty, které zraňují, šokují nebo znepokojují: tak 
tomu chtějí pluralita, tolerance a duch otevřenosti, bez nichž není demokratické společnosti. 
Srov. např. rozhodnutí Fuentes Bobo proti Španělsku (2000).” 
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of association (Art. 11 ECHR). The petitioners in this case expressed their aware-
ness of  the ECtHR decision holding that compulsory membership in  profes-
sional associations, guaranteed by public law, was not to be considered through 
the  prism of  Art.  11 ECHR.136 Nevertheless the  petitioners claimed that these 
decisions were not applicable to the issue of obligatory membership in the Czech 
Medical Chamber since the  latter “at present effectively resembles a  trade un-
ion or an association of private law.” Their petition was ultimately denied. After 
a thorough analysis of both the case law of the ECtHR and the legal character-
istics of  the Czech Medical Chamber, the Constitutional Court concluded that 
the outcome of the analysis 
affirms the opinion that it is an institution identifiable with those treated by the bodies of the 
Convention as public law corporations (see clauses 69 to 79 above), whilst it differentiates 
from associations as assessed by the  European Court of  Human Rights in  the judgment 
[Chassagnou].137
The Constitutional Court disqualified the petitioners’ pleas based on the Con-
vention but before doing so it analysed the Convention standard and the relevant 
ECtHR case law. 
As for the practice of ordinary courts in Czech Republic, the attempts to re-
fer to the ECtHR case law diverge as regards their quality. However, in the case 
which concerned the delayed judicial proceedings, the Provincial Court in Hra-
dec Králové138 properly (although not too extensively) referred to the  case law 
of the ECtHR concerning the damages in similar cases139 and ruled that the com-
pensation granted by national court for delayed proceedings can be regarded sat-
isfactory only if it corresponds to sums granted by ECtHR in similar cases.140 One 
cannot but conclude that this assessment reflects properly the Convention stand-
ard.141 Similarly, in  another case, which concerned arrest warrant, the  District 
136 See e.g.: ECtHR cases: Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (23 June 1981); Al-
bert and Le Compte v Belgium (decision on admissibility, 10 February 1983); Popov and oth-
ers, Vakarelova, Markov and  Bankov v  Bulgaria, App. nos 48047/99, 48961/99, 50786/99, 
and 50792/99 (6 November 2003); Simón v Spain, App. no. 16685/90 (decision on admissibility, 
8 July 1992); Bota v Romania, App. no. 24057/03 (decision on admissibility, 12 October 2004).
137 Chassagnou and others v France, App. nos 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95 (ECtHR, 29 April 
1999). 
138 Case 18 Co 420/2010 (Krajský soud v Hradci Králové, 20 September 2010). 
139 It invoked judgments of ECtHR of 17 May 2005 in H v Slovakia and an undefined case I v Italy 
of unspecified date.  
140 In Czech: “podle judikatury Evropského soudu pro lidská práva lze kompenzační prostředek 
nápravy nepřiměřené délky řízení považovat za účinný pouze za podmínky, že výše přiznané-
ho zadostiučinění je v rozumném poměru k částkám, které v obdobných případech Evropský 
soud pro lidská práva sám přiznává (např. rozsudek ESLP ve věci H proti Slovensku ze dne 
17.5.2005)”. 
141 See e.g.: M.C. v Poland, App. no. 23692/09 (ECtHR, 3 March 2015), para. 93 and authorities 
referred to therein. 
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Court in České Budějovice142 invoked the ECtHR case law143 and ruled that pur-
suant to Art. 5 ECHR isolative measures (arrest warrant) must not be imposed 
where more meditative measures are  sufficient to assure the  proper conduct 
of proceedings.144 
The practice of Hungarian courts (like in Czech Republic, Lithuania or Poland) 
is composed of – on one hand – positive experience of the Constitutional Court, 
which seems to be open to the dialogue with the ECtHR, and rather saddening 
examples from the practice of ordinary courts. The situation in Hungary thus re-
sembles the  status quo in  Poland where the  Constitutional Court developed an 
extensive practice of references to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, whereas regular 
and administrative courts seem to encounter obstacles in entering into dialogue 
with the ECtHR. As noted by Chronowski and Csatlós, “ordinary courts frequently 
cite international courts decisions and mainly those of the ECtHR, but they rarely 
use the reasoning and the fundamental legal statements directly in the argumen-
tation in their own cases.”145 
Again, the practice of the Constitutional Court appears encouraging though. 
On 3 March 2014, the  Constitutional Court of  Hungary delivered a  ruling on 
the constitutionality of the provision of the Civil Code (Section 2:44 of the Act V 
on the Civil Code) providing – as the petitioner pointed out – that:
public figures can only be made subject to heavy criticism in  the interest of  enforcing 
the fundamental rights guaranteeing the debating of public affairs, in particular the freedom 
of opinion and the freedom of the press with the fulfilment of three conjunctive conditions: 
(1) if the criticism does not violate the human dignity of  the person concerned, (2) if its 
extent is necessary and proportionate, and (3) if the existence of  ‘acknowledgeable public 
interest’ can be verified.146 
The Court found the passage concerning the ‘acknowledgeable public interest’ 
requirement unconstitutional. It  stressed that “the Constitutional Court applies 
142 Case 3 To 12/2004 (Krajský soud v Českých Budějovicích, 9 January 2004).
143 The Czech court invoked Wemhoff v Germany, App. no. 2122/64 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968). 
144 In Czech: “Je pochopitelné, že nebezpečí např. útěku nebo podobného maření trestního říze-
ní může být tak vysoké, že žádná záruka nemůže vazbu nahradit. Není to však případ obžalo-
vaného při jeho dosavadních zkušenostech s vazbou a s přístupem soudu prvního stupně k 
tomuto problému. Evropský soud pro lidská práva zmíněný čl. 5 odst. 3 Úmluvy vykládá dále, 
než naznačuje jeho slovní znění. Podle Soudu jde nikoli o možnost, ale o povinnost státu na-
hradit vazbu zárukou, jestliže přítomnost obžalovaného při hlavním líčení lze zajistit jiným, 
mírnějším způsobem, než je vazba, pokud nejde o ony extrémní případy. Jako jeden z celé 
řady příkladů je uváděn rozsudek Wemhoff versus Německo.”
145 N. Chronowski, E. Csatlós, ‘Judicial Dialogue or National Monologue? The International Law 
and Hungarian Courts’ (2013) 1 ELTE Law Journal, p. 27. 
146 Case 7/2014 (Constitutional Court of  Hungary, 3 March 2014). Available at: MKAB, ‘Judge-
ment’, <http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0007_2014.pdf> (access: 18 July 2016) 1, para. 
I of the judgment. 
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as the  minimum requirements of  protecting rights in  the course of  elaborating 
the Hungarian constitutional standards the aspects found in the judicial practice 
of ECHR on the interpretation of the Convention” and found that 
the special protection of the freedom of political speech is a requirement in the judicial prac-
tice of ECHR penetrating the whole of the legal system, and it needs to be applied – by taking 
other aspects into account as well – in each case when the challenged expression is voiced 
in questions affecting the community in the course of debating public affairs.147
It is  interesting that the  Constitutional Court not only referred broadly to 
the practice of the ECtHR, but to the case law of the US Supreme Court as well, 
quoting i.a. the decision in the New York Times v Sullivan case.148 
Positive examples of  a  proper dialogue could also be found in  the practice 
of courts of Lithuania. In the 2011 judgment149 the Supreme Court of Lithuania 
analysed the significance of Art. 6 ECHR in the area of enforcement proceedings. 
It studied/examined thoroughly the case law of ECtHR150 and held that:
the ECtHR has consistently held in its practice that enforcement is an integral part of ‘hear-
ing’ (Eng. ‘trial’) and it shall, subject to Art. 6 (right to a fair trial) serve its goals. The ECtHR 
found that it would be incomprehensible if Art. 6 of the Convention defined in detail the pro-
cedural guarantees i.e. the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time, failing 
to protect the same in case of enforcement process. The right to justice is not merely a theo-
retical right to a final court decision, but it also includes the legitimate expectation flowing 
from this judgment. Effective legal protection and  duty to restore legality presuppose an 
obligation of public authorities to comply with a binding decision (see. H. v Greece, Judgment 
of 19 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, p. 510, para. 40). The European Court of Human Rights 
confirmed that the final decision of the court cannot be prevented from execution, nor can 
147 Ibidem, 9, para. III of the judgment. 
148 New York Times v Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (US Supreme Court, 1966). The case concerned a law-
suit between the editor of the New York Times newspaper and the Montgomery Public Safety 
Commissioner Mr. Sullivan. The New York Times published a full-page advertisement solicit-
ing funds to defend Mr. Martin Luther King Jr. The article was critical against the police forc-
es and included some minor discrepancies. The case became a landmark one since the Su-
preme Court developed the  so-called actual malice test according to which public figures 
may only protect themselves against criticism from the press if the latter published critical 
information knowingly involving false facts or where they acted with ‘reckless disregard’ 
of whether information was false or not (which does not include mere neglect in following 
professional standards of fact checking). 
149 Case 2 SA-137-262/2011 (Supreme Court of Lithuania, 9 September 2011). Similarly, in Su-
preme Court of Lithuania cases: 3 K-7-90/2009 (23 April 2009) and 2 SA-209-623/2010 (20 Sep-
tember 2010).
150 However, the  mode of  quotation of  Strasbourg judgments is  somewhat strange since, 
like in  Poland, the  Supreme Court decided to anonymize the  surnames of  applicants 
(e.g. H.  v  Greece, p.  510–511, para.  40; B. v.  Russia, no.  59498/00, para.  34; J. v  Lithuania, 
no. 41510/98). 
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it be invalidated or its execution could be unduly delayed (see. Hornsby v Greece, p. 510–511, 
para. 40; Burdov v Russia, no. 59498/00, para. 34; Jasiūnienė v Lithuania, no. 41510/98, Judg-
ment of 6 March 2003, para. 27).151 
Further passages of  this judgment also contain extensive references to 
the ECtHR decisions. It  is difficult to assess why in one case the dialogue with 
the  ECtHR was possible whereas in  another case, where applicant also pleaded 
infringement of the Convention, the Supreme Court of Lithuania limited itself to 
a brief remark that “the provision was not breached.”152 Perhaps the reason lied 
in different composition of judicial panels in both cases.
151 In  Lithuanian: “Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas savo praktikoje yra ne kartą nurodęs, 
kad teismo sprendimo vykdymas yra sudėtinė ‘bylos nagrinėjimo’ (angl. ‘trial’) dalis, at-
sižvelgiant į Konvencijos 6 straipsnio (teisė į teisingą bylos nagrinėjimą) tikslus. Europos 
Žmogaus Teisių Teismo jurisprudencijoje nustatyta, jog būtų nesuvokiama, jei Konvencijos 
6  straipsnis detaliai apibrėžtų procesines bylinėjimosi šalių garantijas, t.y. teisę į teisin-
gą, viešą bylos nagrinėjimą per įmanomai trumpiausią laiką, neapsaugodamas sprendi-
mų vykdymo proceso. Teisė į teismą nėra vien teorinė teisė galutiniu teismo sprendimu 
užsitikrinti atitinkamos teisės pripažinimą, bet taip pat ji apima teisėtą lūkestį šį spren-
dimą įvykdyti. Veiksminga bylinėjimosi šalių apsauga ir teisėtumo atkūrimas suponuoja 
valstybinės valdžios institucijų pareigą įvykdyti privalomą sprendimą (žr. H. v Greece, jud-
gment of 19 March 1997, Reports 1997-II, p. 510, para. 40). Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teis-
mo praktika patvirtina, kad galutiniam teismo sprendimui įgyvendinti negali būti užkirstas 
kelias, jis negali būti pripažintas negaliojančiu ar nepagrįstai uždelstas jo vykdymas (žr. ci-
tuotą H. v Greece, p. 510–511, para. 40; B. v Russia, no. 59498/00, para. 34; J. v Lithuania, 
no. 41510/98, judgment of 6 March 2003, para. 27).”
152 Case 3 K-3-358/2009 (Supreme Court of Lithuania, 29 September 2009). It is worth noting 
that the Supreme Court found no violation of Article 6 in the situation where the defend-
ant raised that the adjudicating judge previously had worked for five years in the same 
law firm as the  legal representative of  the claimant. The  Supreme Court briefly noted 
that this situation did not amount to the violation of the right to fair trial in the meaning 
of Art. 6 ECHR (in Lithuanian: “Kasatoriai savo teiginį, kad buvo pažeista jų teisė į nešal-
išką teismą, motyvuoja tuo, kad pirmosios instancijos teisme bylą nagrinėjusi teisėja 
Ona Valentukevičiūtė ir ieškovų atstovas advokatas Aidas Venckus apie penkerius me-
tus (iki 2005 metų) dirbo toje pačioje Kauno advokatų kontoroje. Ši aplinkybė, kasatorių 
teigimu, yra pagrindas svarstyti objektyviojo teisėjo nešališkumo kriterijaus klausimą. 
[…] Aidas Venckus bei Ona Valentukevičiūtė Kauno advokatų kontoroje dirbo individuali-
ai, juos vienijo advokatų kontora kaip teisinė advokatų veiklos forma, kurios pagrindinė 
paskirtis – užtikrinti tinkamas advokatų darbo vietos sąlygas. Esant šioms aplinkybėms 
bei įvertinus tai, kad nuo teisėjos darbo Kauno advokatų kontoroje pabaigos (2005 metų 
sausis) iki bylos nagrinėjimo pradžios (2008 m. balandis) praėjo daugiau kaip treji metai, 
nenustatyta kitų faktinių aplinkybių, leidžiančių abejoti teisėjos nešališkumu, teisėjų ko-
legija konstatuoja, kad kasatorių teisė į nešališką teismą nebuvo pažeista, Konvencijos 6 
straipsnio 1 dalis).”
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3.2. The Fake Dialogue: Decorating the Reasoning Instead 
of Reading the Case Law and Cases of Abusive 
Interpretation
It is a regular practice of Polish courts to pretend dialoguing with the ECtHR 
instead of  really doing so. The  manifestation of  such practice appears when 
a court – instead of finding a proper case law and drawing conclusions from it 
– decorates the reasoning by random references to some accidentally chosen de-
cisions of the ECtHR. The Supreme Administrative Court in the case153 concern-
ing the decision of one of regional administrative courts imposing an obligation 
to pay the court fee (of 1000 PLN) quoted the ECtHR decision in Airey154 of 1979, 
without even noting the available recent case law, e.g. the McKee case.155 The Su-
preme Administrative Court did not go into details of the issue of court fees, which 
were discussed by the ECtHR on many occasions156 and did not assess whether 
the obligation to pay the court fee for initiating the proceedings did not consti-
tute an ‘excessive burden’ unjustifiably restricting the applicant’s access to a court. 
Instead, it just somewhat bluntly and superficially noted that the ECtHR jurispru-
dence (represented by the abovementioned Airey judgment) accepted limitation 
of access to a court resulting from imposition of court fees. As a matter of fact 
though, the  Convention standard is  a  bit more nuanced. In  the circumstances 
of  the case pending before the Supreme Administrative Court the  finding that 
the Convention was not violated seemed to be correct especially since the appli-
cant did not even request for exemption from duty to pay the court fee. However, 
this does not mean, as the Court’s order suggests, that the ECtHR approves ‘any’ 
dismissal of the case motivated by failure to pay the court fee. Normally, it takes 
into account the circumstances of the case, the situation of the party to the pro-
ceedings, the nature of  the proceedings (the ECtHR does not accept automatic 
dismissal of applications for exemptions from court fees in case of commercial 
companies), information presented by the interested party and the quality of rea-
soning of the domestic court.157 
Some courts decide to abuse the ECtHR case law by a ‘cherry-picking’ tactics i.e. 
invoking only such judgments that fit the assumption already made by the court. 
A  good example of  this approach is  the ruling of  the Supreme Administrative 
153 Case I GSK 2071/15 (Supreme Administrative Court, order, 20 November 2015). 
154 Airey v Ireland, App. no. 6289/73 (ECtHR, 9 October 1979). 
155 McKee v Hungary, App. no. 22840/07 (ECtHR, 3 June 2014). 
156 Scordino v  Italy, App. no. 36813/97 (ECtHR, 29 March 2006), para. 201 and  a  whole series 
of other similar Italian cases, or Apostol v Greece, App. no. 40765/02 (ECtHR, 28 November 
2006) which was devoted entirely to the question of court fees imposed on parties initiating 
judicial proceedings. 
157 See: P. Hofmański, A. Wróbel, ‘Komentarz do  art. 6 EKPC’, [in:] Wróbel A. (ed.), Konwencja 
o  Ochronie Praw Człowieka i  Podstawowych Wolności. Komentarz. Tom I  (Wydawnictwo 
CH Beck 2010), p. 298 and the case law of the ECtHR referred to therein. 
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Court158 rejecting the transcription of a foreign civil status act following the re-
quest of a homosexual couple desiring to register a British birth certificate of their 
daughter in the Polish birth register. The case was brought as a cassation com-
plaint of the applicants from the judgment of the Łódź Administrative Court.159 
The applicants pleaded that the disputed judgment of the Court violated Art. 14 
and  8  ECHR. The  Łódź Administrative Court invoked the  ECtHR judgment 
in Gas and Dubois160 in which the Court found no violation of Art. 14 in conjunc-
tion with Art. 8 ECHR in a case concerning the ban of second-parent adoption for 
same-sex couples. However, the Strasbourg ruling was delivered by 6 votes to one. 
Three of the prominent judges (Costa, Spielmann and Berro-Lefèvre) presented 
concurring opinions in which they stressed that they hoped that “the French leg-
islature will not merely be satisfied with the finding of no violation and will decide 
[…] to review this issue.”161 In these circumstances a national court should be care-
ful before deciding to follow the stance taken in such judgment, especially when it 
was delivered in the area where fast developments of interpretation and evolution 
of interpretative consensus take place. The Supreme Administrative Court decid-
ed the case in December 2014, i.e. almost two years after the X v Austria.162 In the 
latter ruling the Strasbourg Court found violation of Art. 14 taken in conjunction 
with Art. 8 ECHR in a case concerning Austrian ban of second-parent adoption 
for same-sex couples. The Supreme Administrative Court disregarded these de-
velopments and instead abused the ECtHR ruling in Schalk and Kopf by limiting 
its reference to this case (in which the ECtHR for the first time decided that State 
Parties are obliged to introduce some type of formalisation for same-sex couples 
cohabitation163) to the finding that “states are free to limit the access to marriage 
158 Case II OSK 1298/13 (Supreme Administrative Court, 17 December 2014). 
159 Case III SA/Łd 1100/12 (Regional Administrative Court in Łódź, 14 February 2013). 
160 Gas and Dubois v France, App. no. 25951/07 (ECtHR, 15 June 2012). 
161 Concurring opinion of judge Costa joined by judge Spielmann in Gas and Dubois. The second 
concurring opinion was concluded with the following statement: “I echo Judge Costa’s call 
for the legislature to revisit the issue by bringing the wording of Art. 365 of the Civil Code into 
line with contemporary social reality.”
162 X and Others v Austria, App. no. 19010/07 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013). 
163 Schalk and Kopf v Austria, App. no. 30141/04 (ECtHR, 22 November 2010). In this case the Court 
ruled (para. 105) that “the area in question must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving 
rights with no established consensus, where States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation 
in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes” and (para. 106) “the Austrian Regis-
tered Partnership Act, which came into force on 1 January 2010, reflects the evolution de-
scribed above and is thus part of the emerging European consensus. Though not in the van-
guard, the Austrian legislator cannot be reproached for not having introduced the Registered 
Partnership Act any earlier.” Clearly, the reasons why the Court found ‘no violation’ was that 
the legislative changes actually were introduced and whilst the State Parties enjoy margin 
of appreciation as regards the timing this is not the case for the decision to introduce recog-
nition. This understanding of the Court’s stance was later confirmed in Vallianatos and others 
v Greece, App. nos 29381/09 and 32684/09 (ECtHR, 7 November 2013) and Oliari and Others 
v Italy, App. nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 
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to same-sex couples.”164 Transparently, the Supreme Administrative Court picked 
the  ECtHR decisions to legitimize its own assessment, while at the  same time 
abusing the actual standing accepted in the ECtHR case law. The Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court even went on to disregard the well-settled case law of Polish 
courts concerning the duty to interpret domestic laws in accordance with the case 
law of the ECtHR and the Convention. The Court reproached the applicant for 
expecting it to construe Art.  47 of  the Constitution (guaranteeing the  respect 
for privacy and  self-determination) in  accordance with Art.  14 in  conjunction 
with Art. 8 ECHR.165 This case provided the opportunity to enter into dialogue 
with the ECtHR, which was not taken by the SAC. The domestic court actual-
ly failed to explore the  standard developed by the  Strasbourg Court and  thus, 
instead of delivering a judgment encompassing a concurring or dissenting dia-
logue, it abused the ECtHR interpretation to enhance the persuasive power of its 
own judgment. 
Finally, another well-settled practice of  courts is  to refer to ECtHR rulings 
through quotations from descriptive material (legal writings) instead of  quota-
tions made directly from the  ECtHR decisions. A  series of  rulings of  Supreme 
Administrative Court delivered in May 2015 provide a good example.166 The Su-
preme Administrative Court cited a work published in one of on-line sources,167 
which referred to some ECtHR decisions,168 however, no references were made 
in the Court’s reasoning to the decisions of the ECtHR themselves. The court did 
not actually read the relevant decisions of the ECtHR but limited itself to quoting 
the work evoking them. 
In Lithuania one may trace the symptoms of a regular dialogue between do-
mestic courts and  the ECtHR. Certain (positive or negative) examples can be 
found in  this contribution. As in  the Czech Republic or Hungary, in  Lithuania 
the Constitutional Court makes extensive references to the case law of the ECtHR. 
164 In Polish: “w orzecznictwie ETPCz przyjmuje się, że państwom wciąż wolno ograniczać dostęp 
do  związków małżeńskich parom osób tej samej płci (wyrok ETPCz z  24 czerwca 2010  r. 
w sprawie Schalk i Kopf przeciwko Austrii). Odnosi się to również do związków partnerskich.”
165 In  Polish: “tego warunku nie spełnia powołanie  się w  uzasadnieniu skargi kasacyjnej […] 
na enigmatyczną konieczność wykładni art. 47 Konstytucji w szczególności rozpatrywanym 
łącznie z art. 8 oraz art. 14 Konwencji […].”
166 Cases: I OZ 419/15, I OZ 420/15 and I OZ 421/15 (Supreme Administrative Court, decisions, 
6 May 2015). 
167 M. Stępień, ‘Nadużycie prawa do sądu – czy sądy są bezsilne względem pieniaczy sądowych?’, 
[in:] M. Balcerzak, T. Jasudowicz, J. Kapelańska-Pręgowska (eds), Europejska Konwencja 
Praw Człowieka i jej system kontrolny – perspektywa systemowa i orzecznicza (Katedra Praw 
Człowieka, Wydział Prawa i Administracji, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 2011), see in par-
ticular, p. 441. 
168 ECtHR cases: Winer v  United Kingdom, App. no. 10871/84 (10 July 1986); W. v  Germany, 
App. no. 11564/85 (4 December 1985); Steward-Brady v United Kingdom, App. no. 27436/95 
(2 July 1997). 
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In the judgment of 28 September 2011169 the Court analysed whether the Resolu-
tion of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania No. X-1569: 
“On the Approval of  the State Family Policy Concept” of 3 June 2008, is not in conflict 
with Paragraph 1 of Art. 6, Paragraph 1 of Art. 7, Paragraph 1 of Art. 38 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Lithuania and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule 
of  law.170 The  disputed Resolution consolidated the  definitions of  the notions of  family 
(Item 1.6.9), harmonious family (Item 1.6.2), extended family (Item 1.6.4) and incomplete 
family (Item 1.6.6). In  part III of  the judgment the  CC found that: “The constitutional 
concept of  family must also be construed by taking account of  the international com-
mitments of the State of Lithuania that were undertaken after it had ratified the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms […]. Art. 8 of  the 
Convention guarantees the right to respect for family life. The European Court of Human 
Rights […] in  its jurisprudence, which is  important for the  construction of  Lithuanian 
law as a source of construction of law, has more than once analysed the concept of family. 
In  the case Marckx v Belgium the ECHR held that the concept of  family life is not con-
fined to families formed on the basis of marriage and that it may cover other de facto rela-
tionships. The support and encouragement of the traditional family is in itself legitimate 
169 Case 21/2008 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 28 September 2011). 
170 See also another example of  extensive reference to the  ECtHR practice by the  Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court in  Judgment of  the Lithuanian Constitutional Court of  12 April 2013 
on the  duty to provide the  information about a  person to whom a  vehicle was entrusted, 
case no. 8/2010–132/2010, § 11, where it held that the right to remain silent and the privilege 
against self-incrimination are not absolute (the judgment of 8 July 2004 in Weh v Austria (App. 
no. 38544/98); it does not follow that any direct compulsion will automatically result in a vi-
olation; although the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 is an unqualified right, what constitutes 
a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circum-
stances of the particular case. In order to determine whether the essence of the right to re-
main silent and privilege against self-incrimination was infringed, a court must take into ac-
count the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the existence of any 
relevant safeguards in the procedure, and the use to which any material so obtained was put 
(the judgment of 29 June 2007 in the case of O’Halloran and Francis v the United Kingdom 
(App. nos 15809/02 and 25624/02). The ECtHR has also noted that the obligation to inform 
the authorities is a common feature of the Contracting States’ legal orders and that it may 
concern a wide range of issues (e.g., the obligation to reveal one’s identity to the police in cer-
tain situations) (the judgment of 8 July 2004 in the case of Weh v Austria (App. no. 38544/98)). 
The ECtHR, when considering the cases concerning the liability of owners (holders) of vehi-
cles for non-compliance or improper compliance with the obligation to indicate the identity 
of the driver, held that an impending sanction for refusal to disclose the identity of the driv-
er or an inaccurate disclosure of the information does not violate the right to remain silent 
(Art.  6 of  the Convention) (the judgment of  8 July 2004 in  the case of  Weh v  Austria (App. 
no. 38544/98); the judgment of 29 June 2007 in the case of O’Halloran and Francis v the United 
Kingdom (App. nos 15809/02 and 25624/02)). It is merely the obligation of a person who is the 
registered car owner to give information as to who was driving the car; a simple fact – namely 
who was the driver of the car – is not in itself incriminating (the judgment of 8 July 2004 in the 
case of Weh v Austria (App. no. 38544/98)).
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or even praiseworthy, however, in the achievement of this end recourse must not be had 
to measures whose object or result is to prejudice the natural family, since the members 
of such a family enjoy the guarantees of Art. 8 of the Convention (which regulates inter alia 
the right to respect for family life) on an equal footing with the members of the traditional 
family […]. The right to family life not merely implies a duty for the states to abstain from 
unlawful interference with a person’s family life, but there may be also positive obligations 
necessary to ensure effective protection of this right of the person […]. When establishing 
what relationships are encompassed by the notion ‘family life’, a great number of factors 
might be taken into consideration, e.g., the  living together, permanence of  the relation-
ship, character of the demonstrated mutual obligations, etc. In the opinion of the ECHR, 
the  notion ‘respect for family life’ means that biological and  social reality prevail over 
a legal presumption, which flies in the face of established facts (judgment of 27 October 
1994 in the case Kroon and others v The Netherlands, Application no. 18535/91). Family 
life may be established even if the relationship between persons has ended. The mutual 
enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element 
of  family life even when the  relationship between the parents has broken down (judge-
ment of 26 May 1994 in the case Keegan v Ireland, Application no. 16969/90). Construing 
the concept of family life, the ECHR has been gradually broadening it and has held that 
the concept of family life encompasses the relationships of not only parents (married or 
unmarried) with their children, but also interrelationships between other persons, inter 
alia ties between near relatives. In the aforementioned case Marckx v Belgium it was held 
that family life includes at least the ties between near relatives (for instance those between 
grandparents and grandchildren), since such relatives may play a considerable part in fam-
ily life (judgement of 13 June 1979 in the case Marckx v Belgium, Application no. 6833/74). 
In  other case, into the  concept of  family life, the  ECHR also included the  ‘family life’ 
of brothers and sisters (judgement of 26 September 1997 in the case El Boujaïdi v France, 
Application no. 25613/94) […].171 
Although the deliberations on the  ‘concept of  family life’ in  the ECtHR case 
law are quite elaborate, one may be struck by the  lack of  reference to the more 
recent practice of the ECtHR concerning the topical issue, such as S.H.172 (family 
life-related problems of  artificial fertilization), Schalk and  Kopff (right of  same-
sex couples to respect of  family life173) or Elsholz174 (family life of  ‘parties living 
together out of wedlock’). Therefore, it seems appropriate to qualify this judgment 
to the category of a ‘fake dialogue’ simply because a proper dialogue assumes some 
regularity and reflecting of the current scene of interpretation of the Convention. 
When the judgment lacks these features, it can hardly be deemed as belonging to 
a ‘proper dialogue’ with the ECtHR. 
171 Case 21/2008 (Lithuanian Constitutional Court, 28 September 2011) 22, paras III.1–III.1.3.
172 S.H. and others v Austria, App. no. 57813/00 (ECtHR, 1 April 2010) subsequently referred to 
the Grand Chamber (judgment of 3 November 2011). 
173 Referred to above. 
174 Elsholz v Germany, App. no. 25735/94 (ECtHR, 13 July 2000). 
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3.3. The Failed (Non-attempted) Dialogue: Cases 
of Non-implementation of the ECHR Standard
3.3.1. Poland
The practice of  Polish courts provides for examples of  non-implementation 
of the standard resulting from ECtHR decisions. It appears where courts simply 
ignore the duty of ‘taking into account’ the case law of Strasbourg. 
The European Court of  Human Rights on several occasions dealt with 
the status of ‘assesors’ (junior judges) in the Polish criminal proceedings. In the 
leading case Henryk Urban and  Ryszard Urban v  Poland175 and  subsequently 
in the case Mirosław Garlicki v Poland176 the ECtHR formulated the twofold test 
applicable in cases concerning the alleged violation of Art. 6 or Art. 5(3) ECHR 
where assessors decided on the  application of  a  temporary arrest warrant. 
The first element of this test concerns the institutional deficiency of an assessor 
who can be removed from his or her judicial office at any time by the Minis-
ter of  Justice (a  political officer and  member of  the government). The  asses-
sors do not enjoy, therefore, a sufficient independence vis-à-vis the executive. 
The second element of the ECtHR test is whether the circumstances of a par-
ticular case could give rise to a legitimate suspicion that the Minister of Justice 
took an interest in the proceedings. However, even in the absence of the second 
element, the  standards stemming from the  aforementioned provisions of  the 
Convention fail to be met. One has to note that the deficient status of assessors 
in  criminal proceedings had been –  prior to the  date of  each of  the ECtHR’s 
rulings – subject to constitutionality review held by the Polish Constitutional 
Court. It found177 that Polish law making it possible for the assessors to perform 
judicial functions and – inter alia – decide on the application of temporary ar-
rest warrants (Art. 135(1) of the Act on the Organisation of Courts) is incom-
patible with Art. 45(1)(1) of the Constitution – a provision which is essentially 
a corollary of the guarantee afforded by Art. 6 ECHR. The Constitutional Court 
invoked Art. 6 ECHR178 and held that “the principal argument indicative of the 
unconstitutionality of the vesting of judicial powers in an assessor is the admis-
sibility of his or her dismissal, including even during the period in which an 
assessor exercises judicial powers.” Acting under Art. 190(3) of the Constitution 
the Constitutional Court decided that “the provision mentioned in the first part 
of the operative part of the judgment (section 135(1) of the 2001 Act) will lose 
175 Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v Poland, App. no. 23614/08 (ECtHR, 30 November 2010), 
see in particular paras 45–56. 
176 Mirosław Garlicki v Poland, App. no. 36921/07 (ECtHR, 14 June 2011), see in particular paras 
106–116. 
177 Case SK 7/06 (Polish Constitutional Court, 24 October 2007). 
178 Even though the case was decided as a direct constitutional complaint where the exclusive 
grounds of constitutionality review is the Constitution itself and not any international treaty 
including ECHR. 
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its binding force eighteen months after the promulgation of the judgment in the 
Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland”179 and “the acts of the assessors re-
ferred to in section 135(1) of the 2001 Act shall not be subject to a challenge on 
the basis of Art. 190(4) of the Constitution.”180 However, even though the deci-
sions of assessors could thus not be challenged as incompatible with the Con-
stitution, the ECHR constitutes an independent source of law and nothing pre-
vented the courts from challenging the decisions of assessors as incompatible 
with the Convention. In these circumstances the Provincial Court in Opole181 
and the Wrocław Appellate Court182 dealt with the lawsuit of J. W. who claimed 
compensation for unlawful custody, which was applied by the  District Court 
where the assessor sat on the bench. The claimant invoked the ECtHR judgment 
in the Garlicki case. The courts dismissed his claims stating among others that 
“the decision of the ECtHR of 14 June 2011 in case [Garlicki] refers to particular 
and individually defined factual circumstances and subjects/individuals related 
thereto whereas it has no direct application to the situation of Mr. J. W.”, “de-
cisions of  ECtHR finding violation of  the Convention do  not eliminate from 
the  domestic legal system of  the provisions whose application led to the  in-
fringement of norms of  the Convention.”183 They added that “ordinary courts 
are bound by Art. 190(1) of the Constitution and they apply the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court having general applicability and thus the acts of the asses-
sor taken when the provision granting him or her judicial function remained 
in force were taken within statutory competence.”184 In other words, the courts 
found the decision of the assessor depriving the applicant of his liberty ‘com-
patible with law’ even though it was clear according to the ECHR standard that 
it was not the  case. The  courts disqualified both the  normative effect of  the 
Convention and the binding force of the ECtHR decisions and disregarded their 
duty resulting from Art. 1 ECHR. 
The Garlicki case had yet another interesting consequence in the Polish judicial 
practice concerning the presumption of innocence. One of the reasons why Gar-
licki claimed violation of certain provisions of ECHR was the fact that on the day 
179 Case SK 7/06 (Polish Constitutional Court, 24 October 2007), para. II.1 of the operative part 
of the judgment. 
180 Ibidem, para. II.2 of the operative part of the judgment. 
181 Case III Ko 337/11 (Provincial Court in Opole, 16 September 2011). 
182 Case II Aka 17/12 (Court of Appeal in Wrocław, 16 February 2012). 
183 Case II Aka 17/12 (Court of Appeal in Wrocław, 16 February 2012), para. 2 of the conclusions 
(in Polish: “orzeczenia ETPCz stwierdzające naruszenie przepisów Konwencji o ochronie wol-
ności i podstawowych praw nie eliminuje z wewnętrznego porządku prawnego przepisu, któ-
rego zastosowanie doprowadziło do naruszenia norm konwencyjnych”). 
184 Ibidem, para. 3 of the conclusions (in Polish: “sądy powszechne zobowiązane treścią art. 190 
ust. 1 Konstytucji stosują orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, które mają moc powszech-
nie obowiązującą, tym samym czynności asesora sądowego podjęte w czasie obowiązywania 
przepisu nadającego mu uprawnienia sądzenia podjęte zostały w ramach ustawowych kom-
petencji”).
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following the applicant’s arrest, the Minister of Justice, at that time acting also as 
the Prosecutor General, organised a press conference during which he stated when 
referring to Garlicki that “the information gathered and  the evidence obtained 
mean that today we can tell you clearly: Doctor G., acting the part of a virtuoso 
of Polish cardiac surgery, is  a  ruthless and cynical bribe-taker. We have knowl-
edge of several dozen bribes accepted by this doctor” and added that “no-one else 
will ever again be deprived of life by this man.”185 The Minister’s media show was 
fiercely criticised by human rights’ bodies and organisations. The ECtHR assessed 
in this context that 
it is  the duty of  the highest-ranking State officials, in  particular those with responsibility 
for the  prosecution authorities and  administration of  justice, to respect the  presumption 
of innocence, one of the fundamental principles of the legal order, and to exercise particu-
lar caution when formulating any statements in relation to on-going criminal proceedings. 
The Court considers that any statement of a high-ranking State official disregarding the prin-
ciple of presumption of innocence is even more objectionable as it may be seen as a direction 
addressed to subordinate officials.186 
After the  delivery of  the ECtHR judgment in  Garlicki case, the  Provincial 
Court in Gliwice187 and  the Court of Appeal in Katowice188 dismissed the  law-
suit of  some Mr. M. C. against the  State Treasury –  the President of  the Dis-
trict Court in X. Mr. M. C. claimed compensation from the State Treasury for 
the defamation allegedly caused by the President of the Criminal Division of the 
District Court in X who requested the Prosecution to commence criminal pro-
ceedings against M.  C. in  the letter whose title was “notification of  the crime 
committed” (Pol.  zawiadomienie o  popełnieniu przestępstwa) instead of  “noti-
fication of  the  suspected crime” (Pol. zawiadomienie o podejrzeniu popełnienia 
przestępstwa). Polish courts found that the somewhat ultimate formulation of the 
title of the letter sent by the judge was ‘oversight or inaccuracy’ and the real inten-
tion of that letter was to notify about the suspicion that the crime had been com-
mitted. One may argue though that especially a highly qualified lawyer and an 
impactful member of the administration of criminal justice such as the President 
of the Criminal Division of the Court must be expected to observe the principle 
of presumption of innocence with particular caution, as held by the ECtHR in the 
Garlicki case. The Appellate Court, while referring to the Garlicki case, held that 
“it does not constitute a precedent for the present case” since the Garlicki case 
“concerned the  statement of  the state official” (apparently judges do  not seem 
to be ‘state officials’ in the perception of the Katowice Appellate Court) and in 
the Garlicki case the impugned statement was “the opinion that the [applicant] 
185 Both citations are taken verbatim from the ECtHR judgment. 
186 Mirosław Garlicki v Poland, op. cit. (n. 176) para. 133. 
187 Case XII C 242/11 (Provincial Court in Gliwice, 29 March 2012). 
188 Case V ACa 535/12 (Court of Appeal in Katowice, 13 February 2014). 
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was guilty” whereas in the present case the opinion concerned the ‘state of suspi-
cion’ only.189 Nevertheless it appears that the Garlicki standard was clearly disre-
garded in the present case. 
It is a well-settled jurisprudence of the ECtHR that 
the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as such than as regards 
a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open 
to close scrutiny of  his every word and  deed by both journalists and  the public at large, 
and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.190 
This is why one is allowed in a democratic society to refer to a politician as 
a  “dictator”,191 a  “neo-Nazi organisations’ cover provider”,192 a  “typical cerebral 
bankrupt who is lucky to be living in a country with such a limited pool of human 
resources that a person of his characteristics can even end up in Parliament”,193 
“[the King of  Spain] who is  in charge of  the torturers, who defends torture 
and  imposes his monarchical regime on our people through torture and  vio-
lence”194 or simply “an idiot”.195 The intensity of criticism and the choice of means 
of expressing this criticism is subject to a greater level of tolerance in particular 
when a politician “clearly intended to be provocative and consequently to arouse 
strong reactions.”196 
Against this background certain Polish courts dealt with the case of football 
fans accused of  “ostentatiously and  publicly expressing defiance of  the consti-
tutional bodies of the Republic of Poland”197 by shouting during a clearly polit-
ical manifestation “Donald, you chump, your government will be overthrown 
189 In  extenso: “W  żadnym przeto wypadku wyrok Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka 
z 14 czerwca 2011 roku – sprawa M. G. przeciwko Polsce, skarga nr […] nie mógł mieć pre-
cedensowego charakteru w niniejszej sprawie, gdy zarzut naruszenia art. 6 ust. 2 podniesio-
ny został z powodu wypowiedzi wygłoszonej przez urzędnika państwowego. Trybunał uznał 
za  celowe przypomnienie że zasada domniemania niewinności zostaje naruszona w  sytu-
acji, jeżeli postanowienie sądowe lub wypowiedź urzędnika państwowego dotyczące osoby 
oskarżonej o  popełnienie czynu zagrożonego karą zawiera opinię, że osoba ta jest winna 
zanim jeszcze wina została jej udowodniona zgodnie z prawem. Należy jednakowoż odróż-
nić stwierdzenia wyrażające opinię, że dana osoba jest winna od  stwierdzeń opiniujących 
jedynie ‘stan podejrzenia’. Te pierwsze naruszają bowiem zasadę domniemania niewinności, 
podczas gdy te drugie uznane zostały za niekwestionowalne w różnych sytuacjach badanych 
przez Trybunał.” 
190 See e.g. instead of many other similar: Cojocaru v Romania, App. no. 32104/06 (ECtHR, 10 Feb-
ruary 2015), para. 25. 
191 Cojocaru v Romania, App. no. 32104/06 (ECtHR, 10 February 2015), para. 7. 
192 Brosa v Germany, App. no. 5709/09 (ECtHR, 17 April 2014), para. 7. 
193 Mladina D.D. Ljubljana v Slovenia, App. no. 20981/10 (ECtHR, 17 April 2014), para. 7. 
194 Otegi Mondragon v Spain, App. no. 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 March 2011), para. 10. 
195 Oberschlick v Austria, App. no. 20834/92 (ECtHR, 1 July 1997), para. 9. 
196 Ibidem, para. 31. 
197 Art. 49 of the Code of Petty Crimes. 
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by hooligans!”198 which was a rather explicit expression of discontent regarding 
the  policy of  the Donald Tusk cabinet. The  Courts of  both instances,199 even 
though only the  first instance court found the  accused guilty and  the second 
instance court discontinued the proceedings (due to expiration), did not doubt 
that “although the  case law, including in  particular the  ECtHR jurisprudence, 
accepts that the limits of criticism (assessment) towards public figures are by all 
means more flexible than in case of ‘regular citizens’ […], nevertheless these as-
sessments must be expressed in such a way as not to infringe the dignity and rep-
utation of the criticised figure, including a politician.”200 The Strasbourg nod as 
good as a wink to a blind Polish horse. This case deserves further comment. One 
would accept the stance taken by domestic courts had they explained why they 
departed from the  ECtHR standard of  interpretation of  Art.  10 ECHR in  cas-
es concerning criticism towards prominent politicians. In  fact, there could be 
a reason to do so. Poland is  facing an unprecedented deluge of hatred towards 
politicians, including regular verbal lynching. This hatred is  spread by politi-
cians (and their paid ‘Internet trollers’201) but also by regular citizens, especially 
on-line. Perhaps it would be wise and desirable to reconsider the limits of crit-
icism towards politicians since one may fear that this flood of hatred threatens 
the foundations of democratic debate which in contemporary Poland does not 
even pretend to concern the exchange of rational arguments in order to protect 
the common good but rather turns into a sort of verbal wrestling. However, in the 
case at stake the Białystok Provincial Court did not attempt to discuss the case 
law of the ECtHR critically, but chose to disregard it and make a disappointedly 
obscure statement that criticism towards politicians must not compromise their 
reputation. What a lost opportunity. 
In the  Potomska and  Potomski case202 the  ECtHR dealt with the  problem 
of  immovables constituting historic monuments. Their owners cannot trig-
ger the expropriation by the State. Pursuant to Art. 50 of the 2003 Protection 
and Conservation of Monuments Act203 it is only the public authorities who can 
initiate the expropriation proceedings concerning real property amounting to 
historic monuments (immovable monuments may be expropriated at the  re-
198 In Polish: Donald, matole, twój rząd obalą kibole! 
199 Case XIII W 1838/12 (Białystok District Court, 14 March 2013) and Case VIII Ka 499/13 (Białystok 
Provincial Court, 3 October 2013). 
200 Case VIII Ka 499/13 (Provincial Court in Białystok, 3 October 2013): “choć w orzecznictwie, 
także europejskim, zwłaszcza ETPCz, ugruntował się pogląd, że granice krytyki (oceny) osób 
publicznych są dalece bardziej elastyczne niż w stosunku do ‘zwykłych obywateli’ […], tym 
niemniej jednak oceny owe winny być wyrażane w  sposób nienaruszający czci i  dobrego 
imienia krytykowanego (także polityka).”
201 I take this term from J. Bishop, ‘The effect of de-individuation of the Internet Troller on Crim-
inal Procedure implementation: An interview with a  Hater’ (2013) 7 International Journal 
of Cyber Criminology 28. 
202 Potomska and Potomski v Poland, App. no. 33949/05 (ECtHR, 29 March 2011). 
203 Act of 23 July 2003 on the protection and conservation of monuments (O.J. 2014, item 1446). 
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quest of a regional inspector only where there is a risk of irreversible damage to 
the monument). The owner himself is not legally entitled to institute such pro-
ceedings. The Potomskis were interested in being expropriated since they had 
purchased a plot of land which was subsequently found an immovable monu-
ment (Jewish cemetery) and thus became useless for the Potomskis’ intended 
economic purposes as nothing could be constructed on the  site. The  ECtHR 
found that “the domestic law did not provide a procedure by which the appli-
cants could assert before a judicial body their claim for expropriation and re-
quire the authorities to purchase their property.” According to the Committee 
of Ministers’ information on the execution of Potomski judgment, the govern-
ment intended to propose a bill allowing property owners to institute proceed-
ings aimed at expropriation.204 However, no progress was achieved to date. 
Quite on the contrary, the Ministry of Culture claimed that no legislative inter-
vention is necessary since ECtHR had not pointed out at the  indispensability 
of legislative amendments. The implementation of the judgment could well be 
assured by a proper interpretation of Art. 50 of the Protection and Conserva-
tion of Monuments Act, including some form of indirect effect of Art. 1 of Pro-
tocol 1 ECHR. The regional inspector can construe the provision of Polish law 
by ‘taking into account’ the Strasbourg case law and decide that a risk of irre-
versible damage to a monument occurs also where the owner declares his/her 
désintéressement in maintaining the proper condition of a monument. Until ap-
propriate legislative changes are introduced, domestic courts should be invited 
to consider whether the entry of an immovable to the register of monuments, 
which imminently leads to the restriction of the right to property is compatible 
with the Convention where no sufficient scheme of compensation is provided 
for by the  legislation. Instead, Polish courts make the ECtHR judgment shal-
low by stating simply that it concerned the impossibility of instituting the ex-
propriation by the owner concerned and did not refer to the issue of entering 
the monument to the register.205 Perhaps a more principled approach of admin-
istrative courts would encourage the  government to implement the  Potomski 
ruling in a prompter manner. 
204 Source: Council of Europe, ‘Reports’, <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Re-
ports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=Potomski&StateCode=&SectionCode=> 
(access: 28 February 2016). 
205 See e.g.: Case II OSK 1512/11 (Supreme Administrative Court, 14 December 2012) where 
the  Court held that “zarówno w  powołanym wyżej wyroku Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka, jak i w wystąpieniu Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich problem dotyczy nie samego 
wpisu do  rejestru zabytków, jak ma to miejsce w  niniejszej sprawie, a  kwestii związanych 
ze  sposobem rekompensaty Państwa z  tytułu ograniczenia prawa własności. Trybunał nie 
negował konieczności ochrony zabytków. Krytycznie odniósł się natomiast do braku skutecz-
nego działania Państwa w celu zapewnienia skarżącym sprawiedliwego odszkodowania z ty-
tułu wpisu do rejestru zabytków.” 
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The ECtHR ruled in the case Bugajny v Poland206 concerning expropriation 
that in the situation where the plot of land is divided by means of administrative 
decision into smaller plots and some of them are designated to be public roads, 
the refusal to grant compensation from public funds for such limitation of use 
of the plots constitutes the disproportionate interference with the right guaran-
teed by Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR. Some of the administrative courts in Po-
land took the  way paved by the  ECtHR.207 However, the  Warsaw Administra-
tive Court208 ruled that were the administrative decision on the division of plot 
was conditional upon the establishment of  the land easements or the  transfer 
of co-ownership, the right to peaceful enjoyment of property is not interfered. 
The Bugajny judgment was found to be irrelevant in  the circumstances of  the 
case.209 One can hardly accept this stance. In  the end of  the day the  previous 
owner’s rights are  limited as he cannot enjoy the object of his right as he had 
before and this constitutes an obvious interference with the right to a peaceful 
enjoyment of property. 
3.3.2. Other CEE States
Examples of failed (unattempted) dialogue may be found in the practice of or-
dinary courts in Czech Republic. The references to the case law of  the ECtHR 
are sometimes superficial and not in-depth. For instance, in a case concerning 
the Police provocation consisting of instigation to a crime (i.e. the type of prov-
ocation where the  accused did not have the  intention of  committing a  crime 
and he eventually gained such intent after being instigated to do so by the Po-
lice) the High Court in Olomouc210 only remarked that “the case law of the EC-
tHR leads to the conclusion that public authorities must prove that the intention 
to commit a crime, manifested by fulfilment of  its features, existed even with-
out the action of  the Police.”211 No decision of  the ECtHR was quoted, in spite 
206 Bugajny v Poland, App. no. 22531/05 (ECtHR, 6 November 2007), paras 67–75. 
207 See e.g.: Case II SA/Sz 241/14 (Szczecin Administrative Court, 3 July 2014) or Case II SA/Wr 
311/14 (Wrocław Administrative Court, 23 July 2014). 
208 Case I SA/Wa 1745/14 (Warsaw Administrative Court in Warsaw, 1 August 2014). 
209 In Polish: “brak jest podstaw do przyznania odszkodowania w sytuacji, gdy wydzielone dział-
ki gruntu nie przeszły z mocy prawa na Skarb Państwa, czy gminę, albowiem nie zostały wy-
dzielone pod drogi publiczne, a właściciel ma możliwość w ramach dostępnych mu instru-
mentów prawnych skutecznie sprzeciwić się korzystaniu z drogi, albo gdy korzystanie z drogi 
wewnętrznej przez innych właścicieli działek powstałych w  wyniku podziału nieruchomo-
ści odbywa  się w  ramach służebności gruntowej […]. W  niniejszej sprawie z  taką sytuacją 
mamy do czynienia. Z decyzji podziałowej wynika, że warunkiem podziału było ustanowienie 
służebności drogowych lub sprzedaż udziałów w drodze wewnętrznej (art. 99 u.g.n.). Tym 
samym, w  ocenie Sądu, wyrok Europejskiego Trybunał Praw Człowieka z  dnia 6 listopada 
2007 r. w sprawie [Bugajny] nie znajduje odniesienia do niniejszej sprawy.” 
210 Case 1 To 35/2011 (Vrchní soud v Olomouci, 18 August 2011). 
211 In Czech: “Evropský soud pro lidská práva ve své judikatuře zdůrazňuje, že státní orgány musí 
prokázat, že by čin – a to určitý, zcela konkrétní čin naplňující znaky skutkové podstaty někte-
rého trestného činu – byl spáchán i bez podnětu ze strany Policie.”
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of  a  rather generous record of  jurisprudence concerning the  topical issue.212 
Similarly, in another case concerning the delayed proceedings (alleged violation 
of Art. 6 ECHR) the Provincial Court in Plzeň213 briefly noted the interpretative 
standard of Art. 6 ECHR without quoting any ECtHR decisions to prove the ex-
istence of such standard.214 
Two important cases in recent years, illustrating the practice of application 
of  ECHR standards and  dialogue between the  Strasbourg Court and  courts 
of Ukraine, were Timoshenko and  Volkov, both of  significant political flavour. 
Both cases concerned important public figures (a famous politician and a prom-
inent member of the highest judicial authority) and in both cases it took a po-
litical turmoil rather than abnormal process of implementation of the judgment 
to accomplish the task of  fulfilling the requirements stemming from the Con-
vention. 
The first case concerned the unlawful detention of the former Ukrainian Prime 
Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko.215 The ECtHR described the continuing detention 
of Tymoshenko as “arbitrary and unlawful” and explained that “it transpires from 
the detention order, as well as the prosecutor’s application for this measure and its 
factual context, the main justification for the applicant’s detention was her sup-
posed hindering of  the proceedings and  contemptuous behaviour. This reason 
is not among those, which would justify deprivation of liberty under Art. 5(1)(c) 
ECHR. Moreover, it remains unclear for the Court how the  replacement of  the 
applicant’s obligation not to leave town by her detention was a  more appropri-
ate preventive measure in the circumstances.”216 It further observed “on the whole 
the domestic law does not provide for the procedure of review of the lawfulness 
of  continued detention after the  completion of  pre-trial investigations satisfy-
ing the  requirements of  Art.  5(4) of  the Convention”,217 neither the  “procedure 
in Ukrainian law for bringing proceedings to seek compensation for a depriva-
tion of liberty found to be in breach of one of the other paragraphs of Art. 5 by 
this Court.”218 Despite the gravity of these findings and the binding effect of Art. 1 
and 46 of the Convention, it took further 8 months to release Tymoshenko, how-
ever, the reason for freeing her was not the obligation to implement the ECtHR’s 
decision, but the revolution in the streets of Ukrainian cities and the change of the 
ruling political forces. 
212 See e.g.: the jurisprudence quoted in Veselov and Others v Russia, App. nos 23200/10, 24009/07 
and 556/10 (ECtHR, 2 October 2012). 
213 Case 8 To 163/2004 (Krajský soud v Plzni, 17 May 2004). 
214 In Czech: “Nápravu porušení práva na projednání věci v přiměřené lhůtě ve smyslu citované-
ho článku 6 odst. 1 Úmluvy zajišťuje v podobných případech Evropský soud pro lidská práva 
přiznáním zadostiučinění obviněné osobě. Akceptuje ovšem i  ty případy, kdy přímo státní 
orgán (soud) poskytne náhradu ve formě zmírnění trestu.” 
215 Tymoshenko v Ukraine, App. no 49872/11 (ECtHR, 30 April 2013). 
216 Ibidem, paras 270 and 271. 
217 Ibidem, para. 281. 
218 Ibidem, para. 286. 
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The Volkov case219 concerned the former judge and President of the Military 
Chamber of the Ukrainian Supreme Court. In 2007 he was elected by the Assem-
bly of Judges of Ukraine to the post of a member of the High Council of Justice (the 
body responsible i.a. for advising on the appointment or discharging of judges), 
however, it required from the applicant to take the oath before the Parliament. 
The  Parliamentary Committee objected while suggesting that the  issue of  the 
decision concerning the  applicant’s predecessor whose term of  office was ter-
minated by the Assembly of Judges had to be examined first. Also, some mem-
bers of the Parliament lodged requests with the High Council of Justice, asking 
that it carries out preliminary inquiries into possible professional misconduct 
by the  applicant. In  2010 the  Parliament voted for the  dismissal of  the appli-
cant from the post of a  judge for ‘breach of an oath’ (what is noteworthy – he 
has never taken the oath) and adopted a resolution to that effect. The decision 
of the Parliament was taken after the High Council of Justice took the decision 
on making the  submission to the  Parliament. The  applicant challenged those 
decisions before the  ‘special chamber’ of  the Higher Administrative Court, to 
no effect though. As for the Higher Administrative Court the Venice Commis-
sion found that “the composition of  the […] highly influential so-called ‘fifth 
chamber’ of the [Higher] Administrative Court should be precisely determined 
by the law in order to comply with the requirements of the fundamental right 
of access to a court pre-established by the law”, whereas in reference to the High 
Council of Justice it stated that “the composition of the High Council of Justice 
of  Ukraine still does not correspond to European standards.”220 The  applicant 
brought a  complaint to the  ECtHR which declared that Art.  6(1) ECHR was 
violated in respect of the applicant in four aspects, namely “as regards the prin-
ciples of an independent and impartial tribunal”, “as regards the principle of le-
gal certainty and the absence of a limitation period for the proceedings against 
the applicant”, “as regards the principle of legal certainty and the dismissal of the 
applicant at the  plenary meeting of  Parliament” and  “as regards the  principle 
of a tribunal established by law.” The Court also found that “there has been a vi-
olation of Art. 8 of the Convention.” The ECtHR ruled that “Ukraine shall se-
cure the applicant’s reinstatement to the post of judge of the Supreme Court at 
the earliest possible date.” The ‘earliest possible date’ turned out to be 2 February 
219 Volkov v Ukraine, App. no. 21722/11 (ECtHR, 9 January 2013). 
220 Ibidem, para. 79. See also: Buquicchio G., Dürr S.R., ‘Volkov v Ukraine and the Venice Com-
mission’s Approach to Structural Independence of  the Judiciary’, <http://www.venice.coe.
int/CoCentre/Buquicchio_Durr_Volkov.pdf> (access: 28 February 2016), where the  Venice 
Commission concluded i.a. that “The judgment of Volkov v Ukraine by the European Court 
of Human Rights confirms that the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 of the Convention not only 
depends on the circumstances of the individual case, but also on whether there are sufficient 
guarantees for structural independence of the judiciary. Only when such guarantees are in 
place, a fair trial can take place in an individual case.”
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2015,221 in spite of several earlier occasions where vacancies appeared allowing 
to reinstate Mr. Volkov.222 It  took 2 years, the  Euromaidan revolution and  the 
collapse of  the Yanukovych government for the  judgment to be implemented. 
This was not exactly the  success story of  the ECHR effective and not illusory 
implementation. 
One may conclude, taking these examples into account, that the Convention 
standards failed to be effectively implemented by the Ukrainian judiciary. In none 
of these two cases the judicial system worked as the effective tool to implement 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. The happy endings in both 
cases resulted from major political upheavals and not from the dialogue between 
the Ukrainian judiciary and the ECtHR. 
In spite of the legislative framework and the promising directives coming from 
the Supreme Court, the analysis shows that Russian judges are generally unwilling 
to follow the standard resulting from the Convention.223 
Burkov224 reminds that Russian accession to the Convention was –  if viewed 
from a legal perspective – premature and guided by political motivations. He notes 
that the  implementation of  the Convention in  a  day-to-day practice of  Russian 
courts is  unsatisfactory and  a  substantial imbalance appears between norma-
tive provisions and a judicial practice. In his opinion, the optimistic perspective 
that one may take on the basis of the documents mentioned above is spoiled by 
the fact that even the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of Russia 
do not follow their own ‘guidelines’ regarding the implementation of the ECHR. 
The research of Burkov shows that e.g. between 5 May 1998 and 1 August 2004 
only 8 out of 3911 scrutinized decisions of the Supreme Court attempted to assess 
the compliance with the Convention. None of these decisions contained reference 
to the case law of the ECtHR. In case of Arbitrazh courts225 only 23 decisions men-
tioned the Convention at all (out of 38,068 decisions), out of which 8 referred to 
221 See: Supreme Court of Ukraine, ‘Mr Oleksandr Volkov Was Reinstated to his Post of a Judge 
of  the Supreme Court of  Ukraine’, <http://www.scourt.gov.ua/clients/vsu/vsuen.nsf/(docu-
ments)/40758947BA3FE9EAC2257DE00054D6B5?OpenDocument&year=2015&month=02&> 
(access: 1 January 2016). 
222 See e.g.: The  Foundation Judges for Judges, Letter of  29 August 2013 pointing out that 
the  vacancies were available in  order to implement the  ECtHR judgment already in  July 
2013, <http://www.mdx.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/58240/brief-case-Volkov.COM-
290813def.doc.pdf> (access: 1 January 2016). 
223 See broadly e.g., [in:] A. Trochev, ‘All Appeals Lead to Strasbourg? Unpacking the Impact of the 
European Court of Human Rights on Russia’ (2009) 2 Demokratizatsiya, p. 145; A.L. Burkov, 
The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Russian Law. Legislation and Ap-
plication in 1996–2006 (ibidem-Verlag 2007). 
224 Extensive reference to: A.L. Burkov, ‘Implementation of  the Convention for the  Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Russian Courts’ (2006) 1 Russian Law: The-
ory and Practice, p. 68. See also: idem, ‘Применение Европейской конвенции о защите 
прав человека в судах России’ (2006) 6 Международная защита прав человека. 
225 Arbitrazh courts are  part of  regular Russian judiciary adjudicating in  commercial disputes 
and those involving business entities – see: Handbook on commercial dispute resolution in the 
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a specific provision of the Convention. Not a single reference to the case law was 
traced. Burkov proves that invoking the Convention without referring to the case 
law leads to confusions and misinterpretations: in one of the cases226 the Supreme 
Court found that reassignment of police officers to a different place of service vio-
lates Art. 4 ECHR (prohibition of forced labour), which has never been construed 
from this provision by the ECtHR, whereas in another case227 the Supreme Court 
applied Art.  14 ECHR as a  free-standing standard. The  experience of  human 
rights watchdogs, presented by Burkov, is that not in a single case judges of Rus-
sian courts invoke the Convention (let alone the case law) of their own initiative. 
Positive examples are extremely rare and these are the solicitors that inalienably 
provoke them.228 
In Lithuania, like in Hungary, Czech Republic or Poland, the practice of or-
dinary courts is divergent and sometimes it is far from the proper dialogue with 
the  ECtHR described above. References are  sometimes superficial and  not in-
depth, whereas sometimes the dialogue consists of proper analysis of  the Stras-
bourg acquis. For instance, in one of the cases the Supreme Court of Lithuania, 
confronted with a plea alleging the breach of Art. 6(2) ECHR by violating the prin-
ciple of  presumption of  innocence,229 only briefly noted that the  said principle 
is guaranteed by Art. 31 of the Constitution of the Republic and it had not been 
violated.230 No references to ECtHR case law were made in spite of the existence 
of the variety of relevant ECtHR jurisprudence.231 It is striking that the Conven-
tion background was not discussed taking into consideration that the applicant 
invoked Art. 6 ECHR. 
Russian Federation, <http://www.ita.doc.gov/goodgovernance/adobe/Chapter%201/1-A%20
Arbitrazh%20Courts.pdf> (access: 5 February 2016). 
226 Appeal of the Trade Union of Personnel of the Militia of the City of Moscow v Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 16 November 2000). 
227 Kolotkov v Government of the Russian Federation (Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 
13 March 2003). 
228 Burkov invokes in  this respect the  decision of  the Presidium of  the Sverdlovsk Region 
Court of 13 July 2005 which applied Art. 6 ECHR and extensively quoted Posokhov v Russia, 
App. no. 63486/00 (ECtHR, 4 March 2003). A.L. Burkov, ‘Implementation of the Convention…’ 
(n. 224), p. 75. 
229 Case 2 K-123/2010 (Supreme Court of Lithuania, 30 March 2010). 
230 In Lithuanian: “Kasatorių argumentai dėl BPK 44 straipsnio 6 dalies ir EŽTK 6 straipsnio 2 da-
lies nuostatų pažeidimų yra nepagrįsti ir teisės taikymo aspektu nepriimtini. BPK 44 straips-
nio 6 dalyje ir EŽTK 6 straipsnio 2 dalyje yra įtvirtintas nekaltumo prezumpcijos principas. 
Toks principas įtvirtintas Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijos 31 straipsnio 1 dalyje. Nekaltu-
mo prezumpcijos principo esmė – kaltu asmuo gali būti pripažintas tik įstatymo nustatyta 
tvarka vykusiame procese ir to proceso metu buvo laikomasi visų baudžiamojo proceso rei-
kalavimų.”
231 See e.g.: ECtHR rulings, [in:] O’Halloran and  Francis v  United Kindgom, App. nos 15809/02 
and  25624/02 (29 June 2007); Kyprianou v  Cyprus, App. no. 73797/01 (15 December 2005) 
or Ringvold v Norway, App. no. 34964/97 (11 February 2003). 
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3.4. Non-classifiable Decisions: Problems with 
Identification of the Convention’s Status or the Role 
of National Organs in the Convention System
Sometimes, the courts do not even attempt to construe the Convention stand-
ard and ignore the Convention as a directly applicable source of law and disregard 
its consequences. For example, the Supreme Administrative Court in Poland did 
not manage to avoid error concerning the  very legal status of  the Convention. 
In judgment of 1 June 2015232 it held that: 
the applicant invoked Art. 6.1 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 6.3 of the Treaty (on the EU) 
and  thus exclusively as the  provision of  the Union law. The  European Union acceded to 
the ECHR, however it did so under the condition that the accession would not infringe the Un-
ion’s competence as defined in the Treaties. Fundamental rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion constitute part of the Union law being the general principles of law. Therefore, just like 
in case of principles enshrined in the Charter (of Fundamental Rights), being the Union law 
they can be violated by national court only when it adjudicates in  the ‘Union law-related 
case’. In its ruling C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj […] the Court of Justice also held that in case 
of  incompatibility of national norm with the ECHR, the reference to the ECHR included 
in Art. 6 of the Treaty [on the EU] does not oblige the national court to apply the Convention 
directly and to abstain from application of national norm incompatible with the Conven-
tion. The provision of the Treaty reflects general principle that fundamental rights are in-
tegral part of general principles of law the observance of which is supervised by the Court 
[of Justice]. Nonetheless the aforementioned provision does not regulate relations between 
the Convention and national legal systems of the [EU] Member States and does not speci-
fy the consequences which should be drawn by national court in case of lack of conformity 
of national provisions with the rights guaranteed by the Convention.233 
232 Case II FNP 1/14 (Polish Supreme Administrative Court, 1 June 2015), para. 5.4. 
233 In Polish: “Art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji strona skarżąca powołała w powiązaniu z art. 6 ust. 3 Trakta-
tu, a więc wyłącznie jako przepis prawa unijnego. Unia Europejska przystąpiła do europejskiej 
Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności, jednakże z zastrzeżeniem, 
że przystąpienie to nie narusza kompetencji Unii określonych w Traktatach. Prawa podstawo-
we, zagwarantowane w tej Konwencji, stanowią część praw Unii jako zasady ogólne prawa. 
Z tego względu, tak jak zasady określone w Karcie, mogą zostać naruszone jako prawo unijne 
przez sąd krajowy wyłącznie wówczas, gdy będzie on rozpoznawał sprawę unijną. W wyroku 
z dnia 24 kwietnia 2012 r., w sprawie C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj przeciwko Istituto per l’Edil-
izia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) i  inni (niepubl. w Zbiorze) Trybunał 
Sprawiedliwości stwierdził ponadto, że w przypadku sprzeczności pomiędzy normą prawa 
krajowego a europejską konwencją praw człowieka, dokonane w art. 6 Traktatu odesłanie 
do konwencji nie wymaga od sądu krajowego zastosowania bezpośrednio postanowień tej 
konwencji i odstąpienia od stosowania niezgodnej z nią normy prawa krajowego. Postano-
wienie Traktatu stanowi odbicie zasady, zgodnie z którą prawa podstawowe stanowią inte-
gralną część ogólnych zasad prawa, których przestrzeganie zapewnia Trybunał. Jednakże 
wspomniany artykuł nie reguluje stosunków między europejską konwencją praw człowieka 
a porządkami prawnymi państw członkowskich i nie określa konsekwencji, jakie powinien 
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Obviously, it was the applicant who caused this misunderstanding as he plead-
ed the  violation of  Art.  6(1) of  the Convention “in conjunction with Art.  6(1) 
and (2) TEU.” But it was exactly the role of the Supreme Administrative Court to 
remediate this misunderstanding and hold that Art. 6 ECHR is applicable regard-
less of whether EU law does apply or not. The Court should have distinguished 
between the application of EU law (which did not apply in this case since the facts 
of the case occurred before the date of accession of Poland to the European Un-
ion234) and application of the Convention (which did apply). Instead the Supreme 
Administrative Court went on to use the CJEU’s Kamberaj decision in order to 
prove that the Convention does not apply. 
In this ruling the  Supreme Administrative Court managed to confuse 
and misinterpret the legal character of the Convention and its status in the EU 
law. The Convention is obviously not ‘the Union law’ regardless of how the ap-
plicant qualified ECHR in its pleas. The Union is not a party to the Convention 
and the Court had apparently missed the CJEU opinion 2/13.235 For unknown 
reasons the  Supreme Administrative Court applied the  Wachauf236 doctrine 
to the ECHR, which must be evaluated as a  flagrant violation of Art. 1 of  the 
Convention. The  ECHR is  applicable internally regardless of  whether EU law 
is applied or not. By referring to Servet Kamberaj the Supreme Administrative 
Court tried to prove that ECHR is  not directly applicable in  Poland whereas 
the CJEU only ruled that the reference in Art. 6 TEU must not be interpreted as 
meaning that the ECHR is directly applicable in the Member States by operation 
of EU law.237 At the same time the Court ignored the status of the Convention. 
Despite possible substantive violation of the Convention, it is highly disturbing 
that the Supreme Administrative Court paid no attention to the domestic pro-
visions regulating the status of the Convention238 neither to the ECtHR case law 
wyciągnąć sąd krajowy w  razie sprzeczności między prawami gwarantowanymi w  tej kon-
wencji a normą prawa krajowego.”
234 Case C-168/06 Ceramika Paradyż (CJEU, 6 March 2007). 
235 Opinion 2/13 on the  draft agreement providing for the  accession of  the European Union 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CJEU, 
18 December 2014). 
236 Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v  Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft (CJEU, 13 July 
1989), para. 19. 
237 Case C-571/10 Servet Kamberaj v  Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di 
Bolzano (CJEU, 24 April 2012), paras 59–63 where the Court ruled that “Art. 6(3) TEU does 
not govern the relationship between the ECHR and the legal systems of the Member States 
and nor does it lay down the consequences to be drawn by a national court in case of conflict 
between the rights guaranteed by that convention and a provision of national law.”
238 E.g.: Art. 91(1) and (2) of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland declaring the duty 
of all Polish authorities to apply self-executing norms of treaties. 
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concerning the domestic effect of  the Convention239 nor to the extensive legal 
literature concerning that issue.240
The case law of Hungarian ordinary courts – just like e.g. in Czech Republic 
or Poland – seems to be encountering similar problems concerning the identifica-
tion of the position of the Convention in the legal system applicable in the State 
or the role of national courts vis-à-vis the Convention. Let us take the example 
of the Hungarian ‘Vajnai saga’. Mr. Attila Vajnai, the Vice President of the Hun-
garian Workers’ Party, held a speech while wearing a five-pointed red star symbol. 
He was later prosecuted for doing so under the Hungarian Criminal Code, which 
penalised the exhibition of the red star symbol, and was subsequently convicted. 
The ECtHR in response to the Vajnai’s application claiming the violation of Art. 10 
ECHR, stressed that “when freedom of expression is exercised as political speech 
–  as in  the present case –  limitations are  justified only in  so far as there exists 
a clear, pressing and specific social need” and “the ban in question is too broad 
in view of the multiple meanings of the red star. The ban can encompass activities 
and ideas, which clearly belong to those protected by Art. 10, and there is no sat-
isfactory way to sever the different meanings of the incriminated symbol. Indeed, 
the relevant Hungarian law does not attempt to do so. Moreover, even if such dis-
tinctions had existed, uncertainties might have arisen entailing a  chilling effect 
on freedom of expression and self-censorship” and consequently found Hunga-
ry to be in breach of its obligations arising under Art. 10 ECHR.241 However, six 
months after the ECtHR judgment was delivered Vajnai again participated in the 
demonstration wearing the same symbol and again he was prosecuted by the Po-
lice for doing so. It is important to note that the ECtHR decision assessed in fact 
the provision of the Criminal Code itself as being incompatible with the ECHR 
and not just the practice of law-applying organs. Mr. Vajnai complained to the In-
dependent Police Complaints Board, however the  latter found the Police action 
consistent with the fundamental right of the complainant. Mr. Vajnai appealed to 
the court, which in the first instance held that the policemen were not entitled to 
239 E.g.: Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland, App. no. 32772/02 (ECtHR, 30 June 
2009) where the ECtHR held in § 84 that “one of the most significant features of the Conven-
tion system is  that it includes a  mechanism for reviewing compliance with the  provisions 
of the Convention. Thus, the Convention does not only require the States Parties to observe 
the rights and obligations deriving from it, but also establishes a  judicial body, the Court, 
which is  empowered to find violations of  the Convention in  final judgments by which 
the States Parties have undertaken to abide (Art. 19, in conjunction with Art. 46(1)). In ad-
dition, it sets up a mechanism for supervising the execution of judgments, under the Com-
mittee of Ministers’ responsibility (Art. 46(2) of the Convention). Such a mechanism demon-
strates the importance of effective implementation of judgments.”
240 See e.g.: G. Martinico, ‘Is the  European Convention Going to Be “Supreme”? A  Compara-
tive-Constitutional Overview of ECHR and EU Law before National Courts’ (2012) 2 European 
Journal of International Law, p. 401 or D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights 
Law (OUP 2015). 
241 Vajnai v Hungary, App. no. 33629/06 (ECtHR, 8 July 2008). 
Marcin Górski284
take the inconsistency of the legislation in force and the ECHR into account, and in 
the revision proceedings before the Supreme Court it was held that the policemen 
should not be held responsible for not knowing the  ECtHR’s Vajnai v  Hungary 
judgment.242 The Hungarian courts made it clear that despite the duty of the State 
– therefore, all its organs, not just the legislative or the central government – to 
assure effective protection and observance of rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the Convention (Art. 1 ECHR) – some state organs are quite surprisingly exempt-
ed from this obligation.243 
Although the Vajnai decision can be found already quite disappointing, in the 
Horváth case244 national courts went on further to decide to almost decline their 
jurisdiction in favour of the ECtHR. The case concerned two Hungarian nationals 
of Roma origin who 
alleged under Art. 2 of Protocol No. 1 read in conjunction with Art. 14 of the Convention that 
their education in a remedial school amounted to direct and/or indirect discrimination in the 
enjoyment of their right to education, on the basis of their Roma origin, in that their school-
ing assessments had been paper-based and culturally biased, their parents could not exercise 
their participatory rights, they had been placed in schools designed for the mentally disabled 
whose curriculum had been limited, and they had been stigmatised in consequence.245 
The applicant claimed damages before national courts and the Supreme Court 
of Hungary held that 
the systemic errors of the diagnostic system leading to misdiagnosis – regardless of its impact 
on the applicants – could not establish the respondents’ liability […]. The creation of an ap-
propriate professional protocol which considers the special disadvantaged situation of Roma 
children and alleviates the systemic errors of the diagnostic system is the duty of the State 
whereas 
the failure of  the State to create such a  professional protocol and  [an eventual] violation 
of the applicants’ human rights as a result of these systemic errors exceed the competence 
242 See for more details and comments in E. Csatlós, ‘The Red Star Story and the ECtHR in the 
Hungarian Legal Practice’, <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/2014_4.pdf> (access: 15 December 2016) 2. 
243 See also the follow-up of the Vajnai case in Fratanoló v Hungary, App. no. 29459/10 (ECtHR, 
3 November 2011) and  the resolution of  the Hungarian Parliament of  2012 in  which it ex-
pressed its ‘disagreement’ with the Strasbourg decision (see also: The Steering Committee 
for Human Rights, National implementation of the Interlaken Declaration, 23 October 2012, 
DH-GDR(2012)009, 9). 
244 Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, App. no. 11146/11 (ECtHR, 29 January 2013). See further com-
ments in  K.S. Akoglu, ‘Removing Arbitrary Handicaps: Protecting the  Right to Education 
in Horváth and Kiss v Hungary’ (2014) 37 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review, Art. 2 1–15. 
245 Horváth and Kiss v Hungary, App. no. 11146/11 (ECtHR, 29 January 2013), para. 3. 
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of the Supreme Court […] the applicants may seek to have a violation of their human rights 
established before the European Court of Human Rights. Therefore the Supreme Court has 
not decided on the merit of this issue.246 
The Hungarian judicial system failed as a guarantor of rights stemming from 
the  Convention. It  is unimaginable that national courts who were requested to 
order compensation for the  undisputed violation of  human rights confirm that 
such infringement did exist but they cease their jurisdiction and guide the party 
to apply to the ECtHR. However, the Potomski follow-up in Polish administrative 
courts proves that Hungarian courts are not isolated in such practice. 
4. Concluding Remarks
Courts of all CEE States engage in dialogue with the ECtHR, aware of the duty 
to ‘take into account’ the case law of the Court. In Ukraine it is statutorily guar-
anteed that courts are obliged to treat “the case law of  the [ECtHR] as a source 
of law.” In Russian Federation the Supreme Court went on to declare in the general 
guidelines addressed to Russian courts that the adverse decisions of  the ECtHR 
delivered in cases against Russia are to be ‘obligatorily’ followed by Russian courts. 
In case of legal positions taken in cases against other State Parties they are to be 
‘taken into consideration’ by courts if the circumstances of the case under exam-
ination are similar to those which have been the subject of analysis and findings 
made by the  ECtHR. However, the  recent developments in  Russia spoiled this 
idyllic picture. In Poland the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of the duty 
to ‘take into account’ case law of  the ECtHR. Similar approach, i.e. the absence 
of explicitly provided statutory ‘duty of obedience’ and, at the same time, a well-es-
tablished practice of the highest judicial authorities confirming such a duty, seems 
to be adopted in Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania. 
The references of domestic courts to the case law of the Strasbourg Court are of 
different conceptual value. Generally in  Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Poland the constitutional courts set the hurdles high when it comes to refer-
ring to and making use of the ECtHR case law. The situation is not so optimistic 
though in ordinary or administrative courts. One may conclude that the practice 
of Czech ordinary courts is divergent and encompasses both the instances of prop-
er judicial dialogue with ECtHR and those where courts only superficially declare 
that certain interpretative standard of the Convention exists, without a thorough 
analysis of the ECtHR’s case law. The same is true about Hungarian, Lithuanian 
246 Ibidem, paras 52 and 53. Verbatim quotations. 
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or Polish ordinary and administrative courts. In spite of some very positive exam-
ples, sometimes these courts briefly note the  jurisprudence of  the ECtHR with-
out drawing any conclusions therefrom. In-depth analyses are scarcer, although 
still traceable. Instances of conscious departing from the standard of interpreta-
tion of the Convention through elaborate analysis of differences of circumstances 
are unique. Very rarely national courts simply confuse and misunderstand the sta-
tus of the Convention (see the Polish example referred to above)247 and their own 
role and role of other State’s bodies resulting from Art. 1 ECHR (let us mention 
the Hungarian Vajnai and Horváth examples). 
An interesting feature of  these six jurisdictions (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation and  Ukraine) is  that in  the four former 
States, members of  the EU with a  relatively long record of  participation in  the 
Convention system, there are no normative provisions or guidelines adopted by 
the supreme judicial authorities imposing a duty to observe or take into account 
the case law of the ECtHR. In the two latter jurisdictions there are either explicit 
statutory norms providing for such duty (Ukraine) or at least general guidelines 
adopted by the Supreme Court putting it in bold terms that there exists such ob-
ligation. Therefore it appears that the stronger the regulation obligating to reflect 
the case law of the ECtHR by domestic courts is, the more is the practical outcome 
disappointing. It does not seem convincing that there is such an inverse propor-
tion. Perhaps the reasons lay in other factors such as:
a) the political environment, which is generally favourable to the impact of the 
ECHR and the Strasbourg case law in the already quite well-settled democ-
racies in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland and somewhat 
discouraging in Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
b) the membership in the EU resulting, through the practice of regular dialogue 
with the CJEU under the Art. 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure, 
in the accustoming to ‘take into account’ the positions taken by international 
courts,
c) the duration of  membership in  the Convention system: the  longer it is, 
the more it allows the national courts to learn that violating the Convention 
does not pay. 
In order to strengthen the  openness of  national courts to dialoguing with 
the  ECtHR it would be desirable to consider certain amendments in  the Con-
vention system. Definitely national judges may have linguistic problems and  it 
would probably trigger more interest in the ECtHR case law if all decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court were officially translated into the  languages of  all State Par-
ties to the  Convention. It  works with Luxembourg, why shouldn’t it work with 
Strasbourg? From the legal practitioner’s point of view one may add that judges 
247 See: Case II FNP 1/14 (Polish Supreme Administrative Court, 1 June 2015) (n. 232), pa-
ras 51–52. 
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are tempted by the possibilities of transferring the responsibility for decisions to 
other courts – they are likely to use the procedures allowing them to present legal 
questions to national supreme or constitutional courts in order to receive decision 
providing grounds for some more daring and courageous interpretations of law. 
The new Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR providing for the advisory opinions pro-
cedure seems to be the  tool instigating national courts to cooperate interpreta-
tively with the ECtHR. Especially if national procedures allow domestic courts to 
present questions ‘via’ supreme courts it would probably lead to a more regular 
dialogue with the ECtHR. 
The dialogue in its full form, including references of the ECtHR to the case 
law of domestic courts, could and ought to be strengthened. It would inaliena-
bly contribute towards the greater legitimacy of the ECtHR acquis and its better 
acceptance and  internalisation by domestic authorities. Also, national courts 
would thus contribute to the  development of  international law and  interna-
tional rule of law. However, two basic requirements need to be met if this was 
to happen. 
First of all national courts’ decisions must be more elaborate in terms of ref-
erences to international and  foreign jurisprudence. Unfortunately the  quality 
of reasoning supporting the decisions of domestic courts seems to be rather dis-
appointing. Domestic courts must become aware that their influence on inter-
national law and its development occurs only through the door called ‘judicial 
dialogue’. National courts do not have political power and their impact on inter-
national law requires and results from the high quality of reasoning. 
Secondly, national courts’ decisions must be translated into international-
ly spoken languages – above all: English. Even the wisest judgments of nation-
al courts will have no influence on the development of e.g. human rights law if 
nobody knows them except for some domestic lawyers. If national authorities 
have ambitions of exporting the domestic views on international law or humans 
rights law on international scale, they should spend relatively small amounts on 
establishing institution responsible for bidirectional judicial dialogue. Its first 
task would be to select, translate, comment on and distribute decisions of foreign 
and international courts among Polish authorities (not only the judiciary), its sec-
ond aim would be to select, translate (into English and preferably some other lan-
guages), comment on and distribute Polish judgments concerning international 
law, European Union law and human rights law. One can be sure that very soon 
foreign and international courts would refer to the case law of Polish domestic 
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